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275 
WHO DECIDES FAIR USE—JUDGE OR JURY? 
Ned Snow* 
Abstract: For more than two-hundred years, the issue of fair use has been the province of 
the jury. That recently changed when the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decided Oracle 
America, Inc. v. Google LLC. At issue was whether Google fairly used portions of Oracle’s 
computer software when Google created an operating system for smartphones. The jury found 
Google’s use to be fair, but the Federal Circuit reversed. Importantly, the Federal Circuit 
applied a de novo standard of review to reach its conclusion, departing from centuries of 
precedent. 
Oracle raises a fundamental question in jurisprudence: Who should decide an issue–judge 
or jury? For the issue of fair use, the Seventh Amendment dictates that the jury should decide. 
The Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a jury where an issue would have been heard 
by English common-law courts in 1791. Fair use is such an issue: early copyright cases make 
clear that juries decided fair-use issues at common law. Furthermore, the recent Supreme Court 
case of U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC instructs appellate courts to 
employ a deferential standard in reviewing mixed questions of law and fact that resist factual 
generalizations. The question of fair use resists factual generalizations, turning on 
circumstances and factual nuances specific to each case. U.S. Bank thus suggests a deferential 
review. Importantly, this conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction in 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, where the Court applied an independent 
review of a district court’s finding on fair use. The context of the Harper Court’s independent 
review was a bench trial, and at that time, courts treated the review of fair use at a bench trial 
differently from the review of fair use at a jury trial. Finally, juries are simply better positioned 
than judges to decide the sort of issues that arise in fair-use cases. Those issues call for 
subjective judgments that turn on cultural understandings and social norms, and the 
heterogeneous perspective of a jury is particularly valuable in making these judgments. Thus, 
the Federal Circuit in Oracle wrongly applied a de novo standard. The Constitution, precedent, 
and sound policy mandate deference to the jury. 
 
  
                                                     
* Ray Taylor Fair Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. The author appreciates helpful 
comments that colleagues provided on previous drafts of this Article, including Professors Clark 
Asay, Derek Black, Lisa Eichhorn, Lydia Loren, Pamela Samuelson, Stephen Sheppard, and Rebecca 
Tushnet. The Article also benefited from observations offered by participants of the 2018 Intellectual 
Property Roundtable at Texas A&M University School of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For over two centuries, courts have treated the issue of fair use in 
copyright law as a question for the jury.1 And for good reason. The issue 
is often controversial, turning on whether specific circumstances should 
                                                     
1. E.g., Sayre v. Moore (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b); 1 East 358, 361–62 (“In all these 
[copyright cases,] the question of fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration be colourable 
or not? . . . [T]he jury will decide whether it be a servile imitation or not.”); Cary v. Kearsley (1803) 
170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680; 4 Esp. 168, 171 (“I shall address these observations to the jury, leaving them 
to say, whether what so taken or supposed to be transmitted from the plaintiff’s book, was fairly 
done . . . ?”); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 623–24 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (Story, J.) 
(describing fair use as a “question of fact to come to a jury” (quoting Sayre 102 Eng. Rep. at 139 
n.(b))); DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The four factors listed 
in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are normally questions for the jury.”); N.Y. 
Univ. v. Planet Earth Found., 163 Fed. App’x 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he evidence also supports 
the jury’s finding of fair use . . . .”). 
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excuse otherwise infringing activity.2 Laden with value judgments, the 
issue calls for subjective opinion over which reasonable minds often 
disagree.3 There are no easy answers.4 Understandably, then, courts have 
deferred to juries on fair use.5 
Recently, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals departed from this well-
settled practice in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC.6 There, Google 
used portions of Oracle’s software program as part of Google’s Android 
operating system for smartphones.7 Oracle alleged that Google infringed 
its copyright in the software program; Google argued fair use.8 After a 
jury found Google’s use to be fair, the Federal Circuit reviewed that 
finding de novo.9 Applying the fair-use factors, the court concluded as a 
matter of law that Google’s use was not fair.10 In reaching that conclusion, 
the court expressly held that fair-use findings by a jury are “advisory 
only.”11 At the same time, the court explicitly recognized that its treatment 
of the jury’s finding was inconsistent with precedent.12 Oracle thus calls 
attention to the question of who decides fair use: judge or jury? 
Given that no other court has ever reviewed a jury’s finding of fair use 
under a de novo standard, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is certain to be 
                                                     
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994) 
(“[The fair-use inquiry] is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine 
it recognizes, calls for case-by–case analysis. The [statutory] text . . . provide[s] only general 
guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair 
uses. Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be 
explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.” (citations omitted)). 
3. See discussion infra Part IV (observing subjectivity in fair-use analysis). 
4. See generally Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (“[T]he issue 
of fair use, which alone is decided, is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright . . . .”); 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (Story, J.) (“Patents and 
copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what 
may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtle 
and refined, and sometimes, almost evanescent.”). 
5. See discussion infra Section II.A (reciting common-law history of jury determinations of fair use). 
6. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC (Oracle IV), 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
7. Id. at 1186. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 1196 (“[W]e must assess all inferences to be drawn from the historical facts found by the 
jury and the ultimate question of fair use de novo . . . .”). 
10. Id. at 1186 (“[W]e conclude that Google’s use of the Java API packages was not fair as a matter 
of law . . . .”). 
11. Id. at 1196. 
12. Id. at 1194 (“While some courts once treated the entire question of fair use as factual, and, thus, 
a question to be sent to the jury, that is not the modern view.”); id. at 1194 n.3. 
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questioned.13 Yet the Federal Circuit’s decision is not entirely without 
support. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises14—a 
bench-trial copyright case—the Supreme Court stated that in reviewing 
the issue of fair use, appellate courts may perform their own independent 
analysis without deferring to the analysis of the district court.15 From this 
teaching in Harper, some courts have construed fair use to be a pure legal 
issue eligible for determination on summary judgment.16 Furthermore, 
some courts have characterized fair use as an equitable doctrine, which, if 
true, would imply that judges rather than juries decide whether the 
doctrine applies.17 Thus, although the Federal Circuit is the first court to 
have applied de novo review to a jury’s finding of fair use, that review 
standard draws support from other courts’ statements about, and treatment 
of, the fair-use issue. 
Despite this apparent support for the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, de 
novo review is legally problematic for three reasons. First, it violates the 
Seventh Amendment.18 That Amendment guarantees a right to a jury 
                                                     
13. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“Applying the statutory factors from 17 U.S.C. § 107, we conclude that the result reached by the jury 
was not unreasonable.”); N.Y. Univ. v. Planet Earth Found., 163 Fed. App’x 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]he evidence also supports the jury’s finding of fair use, under the four-factored analysis 
prescribed by statute. While [the copyright owner] vehemently argues, for instance, that [the 
defendant’s] display of copyrighted material at a fund-raiser was of a commercial nature, this issue is 
the jury’s to decide.” (citations omitted)); Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 
410–11 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding jury’s fair-use decision under substantial-evidence standard); Fiset 
v. Sayles, No. 90-16548, 1992 WL 110263, at *4 (9th Cir. May 22, 1992) (same); Jartech, Inc. v. 
Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1982) (same). 
14. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
15. See id. at 560 (“Where the district court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the 
statutory factors, an appellate court ‘need not remand for further factfinding . . . [but] may conclude 
as a matter of law that [the challenged use] do[es] not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work.’” 
(quoting Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984))). 
16. See, e.g., Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining 
that “it is well established that a court can resolve the issue of fair use on a motion for summary 
judgment when no material [historical] facts are in dispute” while treating the inferences that suggest 
whether a use is fair as a pure legal issues); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, 149 F.3d 
987, 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting case law as “rejecting argument that fair use is appropriate 
for determination by summary judgment only when no reasonable jury could have decided the 
question differently,” while affirming grant of summary judgment for copyright holder on issue of 
fair use); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) (denying argument for jury to consider 
fair use on grounds that the “parties dispute only the ultimate conclusions to be drawn from the 
admitted facts” and further holding that “these judgments [in the fair-use analysis] are legal in nature” 
such that the court “can make them without usurping the function of the jury”).  
17. E.g., Fisher, 794 F.2d at 435 (“The fair use doctrine was initially developed by courts as an 
equitable defense to copyright infringement.”). 
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional Conflicts in 
Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 528–35 (2010) [hereinafter 
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where an issue would have been heard by an English common-law court 
in 1791.19 The early history of copyright law demonstrates that English 
common-law courts heard the issue of fair use, expressly reserving the 
issue for juries to determine.20 Thus, the Seventh Amendment mandates 
deference to a jury in reviewing fair-use decisions.21 
Second, the recent Supreme Court case of U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. 
Village at Lakeridge, LLC22 suggests a deferential review for issues like 
fair use.23 U.S. Bank teaches general principles that determine the proper 
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact.24 In particular, 
U.S. Bank emphasizes that issues resisting factual generalizations should 
not be reviewed de novo.25 Fair use is such an issue, turning on the specific 
factual circumstances surrounding a use of copyrighted material.26 For 
this reason, the issue is always decided on a case-by-case basis—a tenet 
well established over centuries of jurisprudence and repeatedly articulated 
by the Supreme Court.27 Hence, this simple principle of U.S. Bank 
suggests deferential review.28 
Third, the Court’s statement in Harper, which authorized independent 
review of a fair-use decision, occurred when the Court was reviewing a 
bench trial, so the statement should be limited to that context.29 At the 
time of Harper, only two appellate courts had ever applied an independent 
review of a fair-use decision, and those two courts did so while reviewing 
                                                     
Snow, Judges Playing Jury] (collecting and discussing cases demonstrating growing trend to decide 
fair use on summary judgment). 
19. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–48 (1998) (setting forth 
historical test for analyzing jury right). 
20. See discussion infra Section II.A (reciting common-law history of jury determinations of fair 
use); cases cited supra note 1. 
21. See discussion infra Part II. 
22. 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 960 (2018). 
23. See id. at 967–68. 
24. See id.  
25. See id. 
26. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
27. E.g., id. (“The fair use doctrine thus ‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of 
the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed 
to foster.’ The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it 
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.” (citations omitted)); see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 
342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (Story, J.) (“[Fair use] is one of those intricate and 
embarrassing questions, arising in the administration of civil justice, in which it is not, from the 
peculiar nature and character of the controversy, easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to 
lay down any general principles applicable to all cases.”).  
28. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
29. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); discussion 
infra Section III.B. 
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bench trials.30 No court had ever applied de novo review to a jury trial.31 
And, as discussed below, there is good reason for this distinction.32 To 
construe Harper’s statement as changing the review standard for jury 
trials would effect a monumental change in the law of copyright, and that 
intent is patently absent in the Harper opinion.33 
In addition to these three legal reasons, de novo review is inadvisable 
simply because juries are better positioned to decide whether a use is 
fair.34 The fair-use analysis involves exercising judgments that draw from 
cultural norms and social values and that recognize subtle nuances in 
meaning. The judgments are inherently subjective. Such subjectivity is 
well suited for the heterogeneous perspective of jurors, who come from 
all walks of life and reflect a diversity of opinion, much more so than a 
panel of homogeneous judges.35 Therefore, juries are better positioned to 
perform the sort of inquiry that fair use demands. 
This Article examines whether courts should treat fair use as a matter 
for the jury subject to deferential review, or alternatively, as a matter for 
the judge subject to de novo review. Part I provides background on the 
law of fair use as well as information about Oracle—the facts, procedural 
history, and reasoning of the court. Part II contends that the Seventh 
Amendment applies to the fair-use issue, affording litigants a 
constitutional right to a jury trial. Part III examines Supreme Court case 
law that discusses the proper standard of review for mixed questions of 
law and fact, applying principles from the recent case of U.S. Bank to the 
fair-use issue, and analyzing the statement in Harper that specifically 
addresses appellate review of fair use. Part IV argues that a jury is better 
positioned than a judge to assess whether a use is fair. 
I. THE FAIR-USE TEST AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 
REVIEW OF THE JURY FINDING 
This Part provides background information about the doctrine of fair 
use and the Federal Circuit’s application of de novo review to the jury 
                                                     
30. See, e.g., Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984) (exercising de novo 
review in reversing a trial judge’s denial of fair use); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder 
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). 
31. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
32. See discussion infra Parts III, IV. 
33. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 560. 
34. See discussion infra Part IV. 
35. See generally Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Summary 
judgment historically has been withheld in copyright cases because courts have been reluctant to make 
subjective determinations . . . .”). 
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finding of fair use in Oracle.36 Section I.A sets forth the statutory test for 
fair use. Section I.B recites the history of Oracle, describing the relevant 
facts, the procedural history, and the Federal Circuit’s arguments for 
applying de novo review. 
A. Fair Use 
The doctrine of fair use excuses unauthorized uses of a copyrighted 
work.37 It originally existed as a common-law doctrine.38 In 1976, 
Congress codified that common-law doctrine into section 107 of the 
Copyright Act,39 intending that the codification not alter the doctrine in 
any way.40 Section 107 sets forth a four-factor test for determining 
whether the use of copyrighted work is fair: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means 
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.41 
With respect to the first factor, a decision-maker must assess whether the 
character and the purpose of a defendant’s use suggests fairness or 
infringement.42 The Copyright Act provides examples of fair purposes 
                                                     
36. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  
37. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
38. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
39. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 44 U.S.C.). 
40. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (“Congress meant § 107 ‘to restate the present judicial doctrine of 
fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way’ and intended that courts continue the 
common-law tradition of fair use adjudication.” (citation omitted)). 
41. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
42. See id. § 107(1). 
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(e.g., nonprofit education, criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, and research) and an unfair purpose (e.g., commerciality).43 
With respect to the second factor, a decision-maker must assess whether 
the nature of the copyrighted work suggests fairness or infringement.44 If 
the copyrighted work reflects content that is either highly creative or yet 
unpublished, this factor suggests that the use is infringing, whereas if the 
copyrighted work reflects content that is historical, functional, or 
informational, this factor suggests that the use is fair.45 With respect to the 
third factor, a decision-maker must assess whether the amount that a 
defendant used, as well as the substantiality of that amount, suggests 
fairness or infringement.46 In other words, if a defendant uses a significant 
quantity, or alternatively uses content that is valuable in the original 
copyrighted work, this factor suggests infringement.47 With respect to the 
fourth factor, a decision-maker must assess whether the defendant’s use 
negatively affects the market for, or value of, a copyrighted work, 
including any potential markets.48 
Congress intended this four-factor test to be a flexible doctrine.49 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly taught that the test should be applied on a 
                                                     
43. See id. (stating examples of fair and infringing purposes). The Supreme Court has clarified that 
none of these purposes listed in the statute necessarily imply that particular uses made for those 
purposes are in fact fair or infringing. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. They are simply weighed in the 
analysis. See id. 
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (“This factor calls for recognition that some 
works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence that 
fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied.”). 
45. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (citing creativity as element in determining fairness under 
second factor); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (second 
factor considers whether work concerns factual nature) (“The fact that a work is unpublished is a 
critical element of its ‘nature.’” (citation omitted)); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 
792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The second factor in the fair use analysis ‘recognizes that creative works 
are “closer to the core of intended copyright protection” than informational and functional works.’” 
(citations omitted)).  
46. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
47. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; Harper, 471 U.S. at 564–65. 
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
49. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679 
(recognizing that for the doctrine of fair use, “no generally applicable definition is possible, and each 
case raising the question must be decided on its own facts”); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975) 
(“Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to 
it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”); see 
also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (“The fair use doctrine thus ‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid 
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which 
that law is designed to foster.’ The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, 
like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.” (citations omitted)). 
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case-by-case basis, without rigid application of bright-line rules.50 The 
Court has further explained that the four factors are not intended to be 
exclusive or considered in isolation, but rather, they should be considered 
together.51 
B. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC 
1. Facts 
In 1996, a company called Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Sun) developed the 
Java programming platform.52 That platform consists of software that 
enables computer programmers to create programs in the Java language 
that will run on various types of computers.53 The platform includes a set 
of pre-written programs that aid in creating specific functions for any 
particular program.54 That set of pre-written programs is called the 
Application Programming Interface (API).55 The API is organized into 
166 groups known as “packages.”56 Hence, the API packages enable 
programmers to more easily create advanced programs in the Java 
computer language.57 Oracle America, Inc. (Oracle) now holds the 
copyright in the Java API.58 
Google created an operating system for smartphones called Android, 
which Google provides to its users free of charge under an open-source 
license.59 In creating the Android system, Google sought to make Android 
interoperable with the Java programming language.60 For that purpose, 
Google replicated 37 of the 166 packages from the Java API.61 
Importantly, Google programmed its own code within those 37 
packages.62 Nevertheless, that code performs the same function as the 
                                                     
50. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
51. Id. at 578 (“Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are 
to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”). 
52. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc. (Oracle II), 750 F.3d 1339, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
58. Id. 
59. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1197. 
60. See Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1349–50. 
61. Id. 
62. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc. (Oracle I), 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d, 
Oracle II, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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code within the 37 packages of the Java API.63 In short, Google created 
an operating system that was compatible with the Java programming 
language by copying structural groupings (the 37 packages) found in the 
Java API. 
2. Procedural History 
Oracle sued Google in the Northern District of California, alleging that 
Google’s Android operating system infringed various copyrights and 
patents of Oracle.64 Relevant to this Article was Oracle’s claim that 
Google infringed Oracle’s copyright in the Java API.65 Google argued that 
the API was not copyrightable, and that even if the API were 
copyrightable, Google’s use of the 37 API packages was a permissible fair 
use.66 The issue of fair use was tried to a jury, which deadlocked.67 After 
the trial, the district judge ruled that the APIs were not copyrightable.68 
Oracle appealed that ruling and also argued that the district court should 
have dismissed the fair-use defense as a matter of law.69 Notably, Oracle’s 
appeal was to the Federal Circuit rather than the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.70 This was because the appeal also involved patent issues, and 
the Federal Circuit exercises exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals.71 
On copyright issues, though, the Federal Circuit was obligated to apply 
Ninth Circuit law.72 
On this first appeal to the Federal Circuit, the appellate court agreed 
with Oracle that the APIs were in fact copyrightable, reversing the district 
court on that issue.73 However, the appellate court disagreed with Oracle 
on its argument that Google’s fair-use defense should be dismissed as a 
matter of law.74 The Federal Circuit thereby remanded the fair-use issue 
for a second jury trial.75 
                                                     
63. Id.  
64. See Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1347.  
65. Id. 
66. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
67. Id. 
68. See Oracle I, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1001–02. 
69. See Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1353. 
70. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1190. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1353–54. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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The second trial resulted in the jury finding that Google’s use was 
fair.76 Oracle then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but 
the district judge denied the motion in a lengthy opinion that explained 
how the jury could have reasonably concluded that each fair-use factor 
favored Google.77 Oracle appealed that ruling, again to the Federal Circuit 
(although this time there were no patent issues).78 
The Federal Circuit proceeded to reverse the jury’s finding of fair use, 
holding Google’s use to be infringing.79 In doing so, the Federal Circuit 
applied two standards of review.80 First, the court reviewed historical facts 
under a deferential standard.81 Historical facts answer questions relating 
to events that have occurred, and in fair use, they concern the actual use 
that a defendant has made of the copyrighted work.82 The parties in Oracle 
agreed to most of the historical facts relevant to the fair-use issue, 
including that Google copied 37 of the API packages to create the Android 
operating system.83 Second, and more controversially, the Federal Circuit 
reviewed the jury’s ultimate conclusion of fair use under a de novo 
standard.84 The court’s reasoning for applying this de novo standard is 
discussed in the Section below. 
3. Federal Circuit Reasoning 
The Federal Circuit was explicit in its application of a de novo standard 
of review. In the court’s words: 
All jury findings relating to fair use other than its implied findings 
of historical fact must . . . be viewed as advisory only . . . . [W]e 
must assess all inferences to be drawn from the historical facts 
                                                     
76. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1185. 
77. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc. (Oracle III), No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2016 WL 3181206, 
at *6–11 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016), rev’d, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (analyzing fair-use factors). 
78. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1190. Though there were no patent issues on the second appeal, the 
Federal Circuit retained jurisdiction because the first appeal did have patent issues. See id. 
79. Id. at 1186. 
80. See id. at 1193. The Court also stated that it applied de novo review to the question of “whether 
the court applied the correct legal standard to the fair use inquiry.” Id. 
81. See id. at 1193–94. 
82. See id. (“The Supreme Court has described ‘historical facts’ as ‘a recital of external events.’” 
(quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110 (1995))). 
83. See Oracle II, 750 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Google conceded that it copied the 
declaring code used in the 37 packages verbatim.”). 
84. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1193. 
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found by the jury and the ultimate question of fair use de 
novo . . . .85 
When the court referred to the “inferences to be drawn from the historical 
facts,” the court was referring to the conclusions that the jury reached by 
applying legal principles (i.e., the four statutory factors) to the historical 
facts in order to answer a mixed question of law and fact.86 The Federal 
Circuit reviewed this mixed question de novo, conducting its own 
independent analysis.87 
The de novo standard of review was essential to the Federal Circuit’s 
reversal of the jury verdict. Jury findings are usually subject to the 
substantial-evidence standard of review, which requires appellate courts 
to defer to findings that substantial evidence supports; stated differently, 
an appellate court may reverse a finding only if the appellate court 
determines that no reasonable jury could have made the finding.88 If in 
Oracle the Federal Circuit had employed this no-reasonable-jury 
standard, the Federal Circuit would not have been able to reverse the 
jury’s finding of fair use. This is because, as discussed in Part IV, the 
historical facts in fair-use cases often support competing inferences in the 
fair-use analysis.89 Reasonable minds may disagree over which inferences 
to draw from the historical facts.90 Indeed, the reasonableness of the jury’s 
finding in Oracle is evident from the district court’s opinion that denied 
Oracle’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,91 as well as 
from the fact that no appellate court had ever reversed a jury finding on 
the issue of fair use.92 To reverse the jury, the Federal Circuit needed to 
apply the de novo standard of review. 
                                                     
85. Id. at 1196 (emphasis added). 
86. See id. at 1192, 1195–1210. 
87. See id. at 1193, 1196–1210. 
88. See SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(“[W]e must leave [jury] findings undisturbed as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 
A factual finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable jury could have found in favor 
of the prevailing party in light of the evidence presented at trial.” (citations omitted)); Nat’l Presto 
Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“On appellate review, the 
evidence at trial must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party that secured the jury verdict. 
Our appellate role ends when there is shown to be substantial evidence, on the record as a whole, as 
could have been accepted by a reasonable jury as probative of the issue.” (citations omitted)). 
89. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
90. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
91. See Oracle III, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2016 WL 3181206, at *6–11 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016). 
92. See infra Section III.B. 
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The Federal Circuit devoted several pages of its opinion to justifying 
its application of a de novo standard.93 In those pages, the court provided 
three distinct arguments. The first argument is based on a recent Supreme 
Court decision—U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC.94 
U.S. Bank addresses the issue of which standard of review appellate courts 
should apply in reviewing mixed questions of law and fact.95 The Federal 
Circuit recited principles from U.S. Bank relevant to the question of the 
review standard for fair use, stating: 
Importantly, the [U.S. Bank] Court noted that “[m]ixed questions 
are not all alike.” The Court then held that “the standard of review 
for a mixed question all depends—on whether answering it entails 
primarily legal or factual work.” Where applying the law to the 
historical facts “involves developing auxiliary legal principles of 
use in other cases—appellate courts should typically review a 
decision de novo.” But where the mixed question requires 
immersion in case-specific factual issues that are so narrow as to 
“utterly resist generalization,” the mixed question review is to be 
deferential.96 
Applying these principles to the fair-use question, the Federal Circuit 
reached three conclusions. First, the fair-use analysis constitutes “a 
primarily legal exercise” because that analysis “requires a court to assess 
the inferences to be drawn from the historical facts found in light of the 
legal standards outlined in the statute and relevant case law and to 
determine what conclusion those inferences dictate.”97 Second, the fair-
use analysis involves the development of “auxiliary legal principles” that 
“will help guide resolution of that question in all future cases.”98 Third, 
fair-use cases do not require immersion in case-specific factual issues, but 
instead the historical facts are “generally few, generally similar from case 
to case, and rarely debated.”99 Thus, the Federal Circuit applied U.S. Bank 
to conclude that de novo review was appropriate. 
The Oracle Court’s second argument for de novo review is based on an 
interpretation of a Supreme Court statement in a 1985 copyright case, 
                                                     
93. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1191–96 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
94. Id. at 1192–93 (quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. 
Ct. 960, 963 (2018)). 
95. See U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 963. 
96. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1192 (citations omitted). 
97. Id. at 1193. 
98. Id. at 1192–93. 
99. Id. 
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Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.100 The Harper 
Court made the following statement: 
Where the district court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each 
of the statutory factors, an appellate court “need not remand for 
further factfinding . . . [but] may conclude as a matter of law that 
[the challenged use] do[es] not qualify as a fair use of the 
copyrighted work.”101 
The Federal Circuit interpreted this statement as suggesting that a jury’s 
ultimate conclusion of fair use should be reviewed under a de novo 
standard.102 As support for this interpretation, the Federal Circuit relied 
on Ninth Circuit precedent that interpreted the statement as requiring a de 
novo standard in reviewing summary judgments of fair use.103 The Federal 
Circuit did recognize, however, that the Harper Court made this statement 
in the context of reviewing a bench trial without addressing whether its 
statement applied in reviewing a jury trial.104 Additionally, the Federal 
Circuit noted that several circuits still deferred to jury findings, including 
the Ninth Circuit.105 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit interpreted the 
Ninth Circuit’s deference to jury fair-use findings as limited to “disputed 
‘historical facts,’ not the inferences or conclusion to be drawn from those 
facts.”106 Hence, the Federal Circuit relied on the Harper statement, in 
conjunction with Ninth Circuit precedent, to apply de novo review. 
The Federal Circuit’s third argument for de novo review is based on 
judicial and legislative descriptions of fair use as an equitable doctrine. 
The Federal Circuit pointed to a description of fair use that both the 
Harper Court and the legislative history employed: both described fair use 
as an “equitable rule of reason.”107 The Federal Circuit also cited a Ninth 
                                                     
100. Id. (relying on Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)). 
101. Harper, 471 U.S. at 560 (quoting Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11th 
Circ. 1984)). 
102. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1192. 
103. Id. at 1193, 1195. 
104. Id. at 1194. 
105. Id. (recognizing the Ninth Circuit’s deference to jury finding in Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 
F.2d 403, 407–08 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
106. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1195. To reach this conclusion, the Federal Circuit relied on a Ninth 
Circuit case, Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986), in which the court denied a defendant a 
jury trial in view of the Harper Court’s quoted statement and the fact that the parties did not dispute 
the historical facts. Id. at 436. 
107. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)) (describing fair use as “an equitable rule of reason”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679–80. 
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Circuit description of fair use as an “equitable defense.”108 After citing 
these characterizations of fair use as “equitable,” the Federal Circuit 
reasoned: “If fair use is equitable in nature, it would seem to be a question 
for the judge, not the jury, to decide, even when there are factual disputes 
regarding its application.”109 
These three arguments falter for several reasons. First, the Seventh 
Amendment requires deferential review of a jury’s fair-use finding; fair 
use is a legal issue, not an equitable one, in the sense relevant to whether 
a judge or jury decides. Second, the Federal Circuit’s application of 
U.S. Bank is seriously flawed, as is its interpretation of the Court’s 
statement in Harper. Third, a jury is better positioned than a judge to 
determine whether a use is fair. These three reasons are discussed in 
Parts II–IV below. 
II. SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY 
The most apparent problem with applying de novo review to a jury 
finding of fair use is that it violates the Seventh Amendment.110 The 
Seventh Amendment preserves the right of trial by jury: 
                                                     
108. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Fisher, 794 F.2d at 435). 
109. Id. 
110. See David Nimmer, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 563, 566 (2018) (reasoning that because copyright 
infringement falls within the “paradigm” of the Seventh Amendment, it follows that “when a plaintiff 
sues a defendant for copyright infringement and the latter defends the conduct as fair use, either party 
may demand that the case proceed to trial before a jury” (citation omitted)). 
There also exists a potential First Amendment problem with applying de novo review. Because the 
fair-use doctrine enables fair users to speak new expression (using another’s copyrighted expression), 
the Supreme Court has recognized that the doctrine serves a free-speech purpose and represents a 
“First Amendment accommodation.” See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) 
(describing fair use as a “free speech safeguard[]” and a “First Amendment accommodation[]”). This 
raises the question of whether, on free-speech grounds, the law should recognize procedural 
advantages for putative fair users over copyright holders. For instance, should free speech justify a 
judge ruling for a fair user as a matter of law (and only if the ruling would be for the fair-use 
argument), so as to rule expeditiously and avoid a chilling effect on the fair-use speaker who would 
otherwise face a great litigation costs in going to trial? Similarly, should an appellate court exercise 
de novo review of a jury verdict that favors a copyright holder over a putative fair user, on the basis 
that its finding against the fair-use argument is a constitutional fact subject to independent review? 
More broadly, should a fair user’s First Amendment interest take priority over a copyright holder’s 
Seventh Amendment interest? Or for that matter, should the First Amendment interest of incentivizing 
speech of the copyright holder into the marketplace of ideas balance out the First Amendment interest 
of a fair user, such that the law’s procedures should not favor the putative fair user? Some of these 
questions I begin to address in a previous article. See Ned Snow, Fair Use as a Matter of Law, 89 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Snow, Matter of Law]. Another work is forthcoming that will 
further discuss the interplay between the First and Seventh Amendments with regard to copyright 
litigants’ rights to a jury on the issue of fair use. 
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In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.111 
As the text of the Amendment makes clear, if the jury right applies to the 
issue of fair use, then the Federal Circuit should not have reversed the 
jury’s finding unless warranted under common-law rules. Common-law 
rules warrant reversal only if substantial evidence does not support the 
jury’s finding, or in other words, only if the court determines that no 
reasonable jury could have reached the conclusion.112 Thus, if the Seventh 
Amendment applies to the issue of fair use, and if the jury’s interpretation 
of Google’s use was at least reasonable, the Federal Circuit has 
unconstitutionally re-examined the jury’s finding of fairness. 
The Supreme Court has clarified that the Seventh Amendment applies 
to issues arising in common-law causes of actions in the late 1700s and to 
issues arising in actions brought under a modern statute that are analogous 
to such common-law actions in the late 1700s.113 The right does not apply 
to issues over which courts of equity or admiralty would have exercised 
jurisdiction.114 Thus, the constitutional right to a jury depends on whether 
common-law courts at the time of the Seventh Amendment’s ratification 
in 1791 would have heard the issue (or an issue akin to it).115 In the context 
                                                     
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
112. See SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“[W]e must leave [jury] findings undisturbed as long as they are supported by substantial 
evidence. A factual finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable jury could have found 
in favor of the prevailing party in light of the evidence presented at trial.” (citation omitted)); Nat’l 
Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“On appellate review, the 
evidence at trial must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party that secured the jury verdict. 
Our appellate role ends when there is shown to be substantial evidence, on the record as a whole, as 
could have been accepted by a reasonable jury as probative of the issue.” (citation omitted)). 
This “substantial evidence” standard—which governs jury findings—is more deferential than the 
“clear error” standard—which governs trial judge findings. See Wu Lin v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 122, 127 
(2d Cir. 2016) (explaining that the “clear error” standard of review requires that “the error must be 
clear,” and also recognizing that the clear error standard “is less deferential to a factfinder than 
‘substantial evidence’ review”). 
113. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–48 (1998) (setting forth 
historical test for analyzing jury right); Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 
(1935) (“The right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English common 
law when the amendment was adopted.”).  
114. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 347–48. 
115. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935) (“In order to ascertain the scope and meaning 
of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law established 
at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.”); 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302 (3d ed. 1998). 
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of fair use, the controlling question becomes whether English courts of 
the late 1700s would have viewed the issue of fair use as a doctrine arising 
at law (for the jury) or in equity (for the judge). 
Modern Supreme Court precedent seems to answer this question. In 
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,116 the Court considered 
whether the right to a jury applies on the issue of statutory damages in 
copyright law.117 The Court traced the history of copyright law back to the 
middle of the seventeenth century, observing that copyright suits were 
tried in courts of law as actions on the case.118 Based on this history, the 
Court concluded: “we hold that the Seventh Amendment provides a right 
to a jury trial on all issues pertinent to an award of statutory damages 
under § 504(c) of the Copyright Act, including the amount itself.”119 This 
language of Feltner makes clear that “all issues” that determine whether 
a defendant must pay statutory damages under the Copyright Act is 
subject to the Seventh Amendment. Fair use is an issue that determines 
whether a defendant must pay statutory damages under the Copyright Act. 
Under Feltner, then, the issue of fair use appears subject to the Seventh 
Amendment jury right.120 
Despite the broad language of Feltner, the Federal Circuit in Oracle 
applied de novo review. Its basis for rejecting the Seventh Amendment 
argument was its apparent belief that fair use is “equitable in nature.”121 If 
equitable, the issue would not have originated as a common-law doctrine. 
The two sections below refute this conclusion. Section II.A recites the 
history of early English courts’ treatment of fair use as a jury issue in legal 
                                                     
116. 523 U.S. 340 (1998). 
117. Id. at 342. 
118. Id. at 349–51 (“Actions seeking damages for infringement of common-law copyright, like 
actions seeking damages for invasions of other property rights, were tried in courts of law in actions 
on the case.”). 
119. Id. at 355 (emphasis added). 
120. This interpretation of Feltner draws support from a Second Circuit case, Yurman Design, Inc. 
v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2001). In Yurman, the Second Circuit considered whether to 
apply either a de novo or substantial-evidence standard in reviewing a jury’s finding on the copyright 
issue of substantial similarity. The jury had found the defendant’s work to be substantially similar to 
the copyrighted work, and thereby found the defendant’s work to be infringing. On appeal, the 
defendant argued that this finding of substantial similarity was subject to de novo review. The 
appellate court disagreed, applying the standard of review set forth in Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which amounts to a substantial-evidence standard. Id. at 108. Importantly, the 
appellate court reasoned that Feltner necessitates this more deferential standard because Feltner 
teaches that the Seventh Amendment applies to “all issues” pertinent to a statutory-damages award, 
which would include the issue of substantial similarity. Id. at 111 (quoting Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355). 
121. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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proceedings. Section II.B observes reasons that courts have mistakenly 
described fair use as an equitable doctrine. 
A. History of Fair Use 
The doctrine known today as fair use evolved at early English common 
law.122 Early English copyright cases contemplated the sort of use that a 
defendant made of a work, deciding whether the use was permissible or 
not.123 Although those courts neither employed the term fair use nor 
engaged in the four-factor analysis that guides the inquiry today, the 
courts did examine whether “the matter so taken” from the original work 
was “fairly” done, such that the taking would “benefit the public.”124 This 
sort of inquiry is closely akin to the four-factor inquiry of the modern 
doctrine. At a minimum, these early cases indicate a clear analogue to the 
modern fair-use doctrine. More likely, they indicate the actual origins of 
the modern doctrine.125 
These early cases treated the issue of whether a use was fair as defining 
the rights of the copyright holder.126 A copyright holder’s rights in 
expression would not extend to uses that were fair.127 Hence, the early 
                                                     
122. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6–18 (2d ed. 1995) 
(tracing history of fair use). 
123. See Sayre v. Moore (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b); 1 East 358, 361–62 (“In all these 
[copyright cases where defendant had altered underlying work] the question of fact to come before a 
jury is, whether the alteration be colourable or not? . . . . [T]he jury will decide whether it be a servile 
imitation or not.”); Cary v. Kearsley (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680; 4 Esp. 168, 171 (“I shall address 
these observations to the jury, leaving them to say, whether what so taken or supposed to be 
transmitted from the plaintiff’s book, was fairly done with a view of compiling a useful book, for the 
benefit of the public, upon which there has been a totally new arrangement of such matter,—or taken 
colourable, merely with a view to steal the copy-right of the plaintiff?”). 
124. See Cary 170 Eng. Rep. at 680. 
125. See PATRY, supra note 122, at 6–18; Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1371, 1373, 1379–93 (2011) (“[T]he fair use doctrine is better understood as the continuation 
of a long line of English fair abridgment cases, dating back to the beginning of statutory copyright 
law in 1710.”). Id. (arguing that English fair abridgment cases constitute origin of fair use in American 
jurisprudence). 
126. See Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 142–50 (2011) 
[hereinafter Snow, The Forgotten Right] (discussing cases from eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
in English and United States jurisdictions that treat the doctrine of fair use as a legal right that defines 
infringement). 
127. See id.; see, e.g., Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) 
(explaining that “a fair and bona fide abridgment of an original work, is not a piracy of the copyright 
of the author”); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136) (“None of these 
rules of [copyright] decision are inconsistent with the privilege of a subsequent writer to make what 
is called a fair use of a prior publication; but their effect undoubtedly is, to limit that privilege so that 
it shall not be exercised to an extent to work substantial injury to the property which is under the legal 
protection of copyright.”). 
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doctrine of fair use did not excuse infringement, but rather, it defined 
infringement.128 This distinction between excusing infringement and 
defining infringement may seem inconsequential, but it does shed light on 
the issue of whether fair use is an equitable or common-law doctrine. It is 
well established that in the late eighteenth century, courts tried actions for 
infringement of a copyright as actions for infringement of a property right, 
otherwise known as an action on the case.129 Actions on the case were 
tried before juries in a court of law.130 Therefore, a doctrine that defines 
infringement of a copyright—such as the early doctrine of fair use—
would have been tried to a jury. The doctrine determines whether 
infringement occurred, and the issue of infringement lie with the jury. 
Putting aside this point that the early doctrine of fair use defined 
infringement, case law expressly supports the view that law courts of the 
relevant time period treated fair use as a jury issue. A 1785 English 
common-law case is dispositive.131 The case was Sayre v. Moore,132 which 
has proven highly influential in American copyright jurisprudence and is 
still cited by modern courts, including the Supreme Court.133 In Sayre, the 
                                                     
128. See, e.g., Dodsley v. Kinnersley (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 271; Amb. 403, 405 (“It was insisted 
for the defendant, that what was printed in the Magazine was a fair abridgment, and, as such, not a 
piracy.” (emphasis added)). 
This interpretation of fair use as a doctrine that defines infringement is consistent with the statutory 
language of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted 
work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”). For many years, courts treated fair use as a defense, 
but in the past few decades, courts started treating it as an affirmative defense, which did not define 
infringement. See Snow, The Forgotten Right, supra note 126, at 155–61 (tracing history of fair use 
from defense to affirmative defense). Indeed, the text and legislative history of the 1976 Copyright 
Act make clear that fair use is not an affirmative defense. See id.; Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An 
Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 696–704 (2015) (arguing that text and legislative 
history of Copyright Act indicate intent for fair use to be defense rather than affirmative defense). 
This fact, however, does not matter for purposes of a Seventh Amendment analysis, because even 
issues that arise in the context of affirmative defense may be eligible for a jury right. 
129. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 349 (1998) (“Actions seeking 
damages for infringement of common-law copyright, like actions seeking damages for invasions of 
other property rights, were tried in courts of law in actions on the case.” (citing Millar v. Taylor (1769) 
98 Eng. Rep. 201, 252; 4 Burr. 2303, 2398). 
130. See id. 
131. Sayre v. Moore (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b); 1 East 358, 361–62. 
132. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b); 1 East 358, 361–62. 
133. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 480 n.33 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (relying on Sayre case for an explanation of copyright law); Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 n.6 (1975) (same); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cty. 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & 
Co., 873 F.2d 576, 597 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, C.J., concurring) (same); Maxtone-Graham v. 
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); Corbello v. Devito, No. 2:08–cv–00867–
RCJ–PAL, 2015 WL 5768531, at *10 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2015) (same). 
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Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, Lord Mansfield, sat as the trial judge 
in a copyright dispute over the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s sea 
charts.134 The plaintiff had expended great resource to create the charts, 
and the defendant had altered them to create his own.135 On these simple 
facts, Lord Mansfield opined that the case raised “a matter of great 
consequence to the country.”136 He noted the competing policy 
considerations in play—rewarding ingenuity and labor versus 
encouraging improvement and progress.137 He compared the facts to 
claims against copying of historical accounts and dictionaries.138 Lord 
Mansfield then summarized these types of copyright disputes as follows: 
“In all these cases the question of fact to come before a jury is, whether 
the alteration be colourable or not? . . . [T]he jury will decide whether it 
be a servile imitation or not.”139 Indisputably, Lord Mansfield considered 
the issue of whether a defendant’s use was permissibly fair or 
impermissibly infringing to be one for the jury.140 As it turns out, the jury 
found for the defendant.141 
Like Chief Justice Lord Mansfield in Sayre, Chief Justice Lord 
Ellenborough in Cary v. Kearsley142 recognized the central role of the jury 
in deciding the issue of fair use.143 Cary is an 1803 copyright case that 
arose in an English common-law court.144 Like Sayre, Cary represents an 
important case on which modern courts (including the Supreme Court) 
continue to rely for guidance in applying the fair-use doctrine.145 In Cary, 
the plaintiff, Mr. Cary, had created a book that detailed nine-hundred 
miles of roads, useful in taking surveys and estimating distances.146 
                                                     
134. See Sayre 102 Eng. Rep. at 140. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. See id. 
141. Id. 
142. (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 679; 4 Esp. 168. 
143. See id. at 680. 
144. Id. 
145. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Cary 170 
Eng. Rep. at 681, to delineate principles of fair use); Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 291 F. 
Supp. 2d 980, 987 (D. Minn. 2003) (same); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 10 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc., 177 F. 
Supp. 303, 312 n.17 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (same); cf. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 613 (1834) 
(relying on Cary to decide copyright dispute that did not raise issue of fair use). 
146. Cary 170 Eng. Rep at 679. 
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Mr. Kearsley transcribed portions of Mr. Cary’s book into his own.147 At 
trial, Cary’s attorney argued that this case was akin to copying a whole 
essay from the book, Paley’s Philosophy, making observations and notes 
or additions at the end of the copied text.148 Lord Ellenborough explained 
that such copying might not necessarily amount to piracy: 
[Whether such copying would amount to piracy] would depend 
on the facts of, whether the publication of that essay was to 
convey to the public the notes and observations fairly, or only to 
colour the publication of the original essay, and make that a 
pretext for pirating it; if the latter, it could not be sustained. That 
part of the work of one auther [sic] is found in another, is not of 
itself piracy, or sufficient to support an action; a man may fairly 
adopt part of the work of another: he may so make use of 
another’s labours for the promotion of science, and the benefit of 
the public: but having done so, the question will be, Was the 
matter so taken used fairly with that view, and without what I may 
term the animus furandi?149 
Lord Ellenborough thus recognized that individual facts surrounding such 
copying would dictate whether copied material was “used fairly,” “for the 
promotion of science, and the benefit of the public.”150 He subsequently 
opined that failing to protect “additional observations” and “corrections” 
that a copier might make to another’s work, would effectively “put 
manacles upon science.”151 These important policy considerations, 
however, did not persuade Lord Ellenborough to determine himself 
whether the use was fair.152 He sent the issue to the jury, explaining: 
I shall address these observations to the jury, leaving them to say, 
whether what so taken or supposed to be transmitted from the 
plaintiff’s book, was fairly done with a view of compiling a useful 
book, for the benefit of the public, upon which there has been a 
totally new arrangement of such matter,—or taken colourable, 
merely with a view to steal the copy-right of the plaintiff?153 
The weight of both Sayre and Cary cannot be overstated in assessing a 
litigant’s right to a jury under the Seventh Amendment. They represent 
common-law courts expressly recognizing that the jury should decide 
                                                     
147. Id. at 679–80. 
148. Id. at 680. 
149. Id.  
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. See id. 
153. Id. 
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whether copyrighted material was used fairly by a defendant. And they 
occurred in the decade prior to and the decade following the ratification 
of the Seventh Amendment. 
Another English common law case that considered whether a use was 
permissible was Roworth v. Wilkes154—a case arising in 1807. It involved 
a defendant using 75 pages of a 118-page treatise.155 The issue was 
whether this was a permissible extraction of the original, much like a 
critical review.156 A jury found for the plaintiff.157 Roworth thus represents 
another English common-law case that, shortly after the Seventh 
Amendment, treated the issue of fair use as a question for the jury to 
decide. 
Courts in the United States adopted these English courts’ approach to 
fair use. Beginning with the case of Folsom v. Marsh158 in 1841, Justice 
Joseph Story articulated the fair-use doctrine, relying on English common 
law, including Roworth.159 Importantly, Justice Story framed the issue of 
fair use as a question that determined whether infringement had 
occurred—not as a question that excused infringement.160 As discussed 
                                                     
154. (1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889; 1 Camp. 94. 
155. Id. at 889–90. 
156. Id. at 890. 
157. See Campbell v. Scott (1842) 59 Eng. Rep. 784, 787; 11 Sim. 31, 40. Although Roworth 
mentions the jury’s decision regarding the damages, the opinion does not specifically state that the 
jury decided the issue relating to whether the use was fair or infringing. See Roworth 170 Eng. Rep. 
at 891. (“His Lordship . . . directed the jury to find separate damages for the letter-press and the prints. 
The plaintiff had a verdict, with £70 for the former, and £30 for the latter.”). A few years after 
Roworth, however, the court in Campbell provided this detail, stating: 
Roworth v. Wilkes was a case in which 75 pages of a treatise consisting of 118 pages were taken 
and inserted in a very voluminous work . . . and, although the matter taken formed but a very 
small proportion of the work into which it was introduced, the jury found for the Plaintiff, who 
was the author of the treatise. 
Campbell 59 Eng. Rep. at 787. 
158. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
159. Id. at 348–49 (Story, J.). Justice Story is arguably the most influential jurist on the doctrine of 
fair use. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (“For as Justice 
Story explained . . . .”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) 
(relying on Justice Story’s teachings and suggesting that he was first to articulate modern principles 
of fair use doctrine). 
160. See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348 (“The question, then, is, whether this is a justifiable use of the 
original materials, such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs.” 
(emphasis added)). Justice Story re-articulated this framing of fair use as a question that defines 
whether infringement has occurred in the case of Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1839) (No. 5,728) (Story, J.). There he stated: 
In some cases, indeed, it may be a very nice question, what amounts to a piracy of a work, or 
not. Thus, if large extracts are made therefrom in a review, it might be a question, whether those 
extracts were designed bonâ fide for the mere purpose of criticism, or were designed to supersede 
the original work under the pretence of a review, by giving its substance in a fugitive form. The 
same difficulty may arise in relation to an abridgment of an original work. The question, in such 
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above, an issue that determines infringement would go to the jury. Four 
years after Folsom, Justice Story again articulated the doctrine of fair use 
in Emerson v. Davies,161 again relying on English common-law cases that 
applied the doctrine, including both Roworth and Sayre.162 Importantly, 
he quoted the portion of the Sayre opinion that dealt with the role of a 
jury: “[T]he question of fact to come to a jury, is, whether the alteration 
be colorable or not . . . . [A] question of this nature the jury will decide, 
whether it be a servile imitation or not.”163 Notably, a few decades later, 
another early American copyright case quoted the same portion of Sayre 
in explaining fair use.164 
History thus supports the conclusion that the Seventh Amendment’s 
right to a jury applies to the issue of fair use. Both before and after the 
ratification of the Seventh Amendment, English common-law courts 
heard the issue. Those courts explicitly opined that the question of 
whether copying was fairly done, so as to determine the issue of 
infringement, represented an issue for the jury to decide. 
B. Equitable Interpretation 
Despite this history, a few courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have 
mistakenly viewed fair use as an equitable doctrine.165 This view might 
exist because courts of equity did discuss principles of fair use in deciding 
copyright disputes.166 When copyright owners brought suit in courts of 
                                                     
a case, must be compounded of various considerations; whether it be a bonâ fide abridgment, or 
only an evasion by the omission of some unimportant parts; whether it will, in its present form, 
prejudice or supersede the original work; whether it will be adapted to the same class of readers; 
and many other considerations of the same sort, which may enter as elements, in ascertaining, 
whether there has been a piracy, or not. 
Id. at 1038. 
161. 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436). 
162. Id. at 623–24. 
163. Id. (quoting Sayre v. Moore (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b); 1 East 358, 361–62). 
164. See Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 9 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896). The Simms court also relied on the English 
common-law case discussed above, Cary v. Kearsley, in describing the fair use doctrine. Id. at 11. 
165. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The fair-use doctrine was initially 
developed by courts as an equitable defense to copyright infringement.”); Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 
1194 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“If fair use is equitable in nature, it would seem to be a question for the judge, 
not the jury, even when there are factual disputes regarding its application.”); Time Inc. v. Bernard 
Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (describing fair use as “entirely equitable” 
doctrine). 
166. E.g., Macklin v. Richardson (1770) 27 Eng. Rep. 451, 453; Amb. 694, 696 (rejecting principle 
that critical review may supplant work itself where defendant had transcribed play and published it in 
magazine); Dodsley v. Kinnersley (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 271; Amb. 403, 405 (“No certain line 
can be drawn, to distinguish a fair abridgment; but every case must depend on its own 
circumstances.”); Tonson v. Walker (1752) 36 Eng. Rep. 1017, 1020; 3 Swans. 672, 681 (“A fair 
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equity, judges would decide all issues, whether legal or factual, because 
courts of equity need not employ a jury.167 Indeed, the early American 
copyright cases that contemplated fair use all arose in courts of equity.168 
But this fact does not imply that fair use—and for that matter any issue of 
infringement—would be considered an equitable doctrine. The maxim of 
equitas sequitur legem (equity follows the law) applies,169 meaning that 
courts of equity must construe legal rights to determine whether equity 
will furnish relief.170 That a court of equity considers an issue does not 
imply that that issue does not invoke a legal doctrine subject to legal rights 
in a court of law. 
An example of this principle is found in Folsom v. Marsh, the first 
American case to articulate the doctrine of fair use. In Folsom, Justice 
Story sat in a court of equity and heard a copyright holder’s suit to enjoin 
the defendant from continued use of his copyrighted work.171 In ruling for 
the copyright holder, Justice Story needed to construe the scope of the 
legal rights in the copyright.172 To that end, Justice Story articulated the 
limits of copyright, which articulation has become the underpinnings for 
the modern doctrine of fair use.173 Notably, Justice Story did not describe 
these fair-use limits as a doctrine independent of or distinct from the right 
                                                     
abridgement would be entitled to protection [from copyright action of the plaintiff].”). In the early 
fair use case of Gyles v. Wilcox (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489; 2 Atk. 141, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, 
sitting in equity, spoke out against using a jury at law to determine whether the defendant had 
infringed. Id. at 490–91. Nevertheless, he referred to the issue as one of fact. See id. at 490 (“The 
court is not under an indispensable obligation to send all facts to a jury . . . .”); H. Tomás Gómez-
Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-
Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1222–23, 1273 (2008) (explaining copyright suits that 
arose in courts of chancery after 1660 and copyright suits in courts of law after mid 1700s). 
167. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION 104 (2d 
ed. 1993); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 31, at 21 (Arno Press 
1972) (1836); 2 STORY, supra, §§ 930–933, at 209–11; cases cited supra note 166. 
168. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348–49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Emerson v. 
Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 623–24 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436); Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 11 
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136); 
2 STORY, supra note 167, §§ 930–933, at 209–11 (explaining basis for ruling on copyright claim in 
equitable proceedings). 
169. See Hedges v. Dixon Cty., 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893) (“The established rule . . . is that equity 
follows the law.”). 
170. See Saunders v. Smith (1838) 40 Eng. Rep. 1100, 1107; 3 My. & Cr. 711, 728 (“In all cases 
of injunctions in aid of legal rights—whether it be copyright, patent right, or some other description 
of legal right which comes before the Court [of Equity]—the office of the Court is consequent upon 
the legal right . . . .”).  
171. See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344–45.  
172. See id. at 348–49. 
173. See id. 
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of copyright.174 He did not even employ any distinct terminology to 
describe these limits, not even the label of “fair use.”175 For Justice Story, 
considerations of fair use were integral to defining a copyright’s scope. 
Indeed, in his Commentaries on Equity, Justice Story explained that the 
question of whether a use is fair represents a question of whether a 
defendant has committed an infringement of a copyright holder’s “legal 
rights.”176 Consistent with that explanation, Justice Story’s application of 
fair-use principles in Folsom—an equitable proceeding—did not 
transform the doctrine into a creature of equity any more than his 
explanation of copyright generally transformed the right of copyright into 
a creature of equity. So although American jurisprudence first articulated 
fair use in a court of equity, this fact does not imply that fair use arose as 
an equitable doctrine. 
The immediate question that follows, then, is why these copyright 
disputes would ever arise in equitable proceedings rather than courts of 
law. The answer is simple. Equitable proceedings entertained the remedy 
of an accounting of profits that defendants had gained through their 
infringing uses.177 That remedy could be greater than the sole remedy 
afforded by the Copyright Act of 1790—fifty cents in damages per 
infringing page.178 For many copyright holders, a disgorgement of an 
infringer’s profits represented the better remedy, so they sought relief 
under a bill of equity rather than an action at law.179 Moreover, damages 
                                                     
174. See id. 
175. See id. 
176. See 2 STORY, supra note 167, § 939, at 214–15. Justice Story stated:  
[W]hat constitutes a bonâ fide case of extracts, or a bonâ fide abridgment, or a bonâ fide use of 
common materials, is often a matter of most embarrassing inquiry. The question, in all cases of 
this sort, has been said to be, whether there has been a legitimate use of the copy-right 
publication, in the fair exercise of a mental operation, deserving the character of a new work. If 
there has been, though it may be prejudicial to the original author, it is not an invasion of his 
legal rights. 
Id. 
177. See DOBBS, supra note 167, at 107–08. 
178. See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (1790) (repealed 1802) 
(providing remedy for infringement in “the sum of fifty cents for every sheet which shall be found in 
[the infringer’s] possession”). 
179. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) (explaining that in 
copyright suits, recovery of profits “had been given in accordance with the principles governing 
equity jurisdiction, not to inflict punishment but to prevent an unjust enrichment by allowing injured 
complainants to claim ‘that which, ex aequo et bono, is theirs, and nothing beyond this’” (citation 
omitted)); id. at 402 (“Both the Copyright Act and our decisions leave the matter to the appropriate 
exercise of the equity jurisdiction upon an accounting to determine the profits ‘which the infringer 
shall have made from such infringement.’” (citation omitted)); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 
34 F.2d 145, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (“This is a suit for the alleged infringement of a copyright, and the 
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under the Copyright Act would likely have been secondary to the 
equitable remedy of enjoining continued infringement.180 In short, equity 
provided a better remedy for copyright holders, so equitable courts would 
frequently decide the issue of fair use. Yet the issue itself remained legal 
in nature. 
Another reason that some courts have mistakenly viewed fair use as an 
equitable doctrine is because the Supreme Court has on three occasions 
described it as an “equitable rule of reason.”181 Indeed, the Oracle Court 
referred to this description when it suggested that fair use was an equitable 
doctrine.182 But this reason is seriously flawed. As an initial matter, the 
test for whether the Seventh Amendment jury right applies to a doctrine 
has nothing to do with whether the Court has employed the word equitable 
to describe the doctrine.183 For that matter, the Court has explicitly 
recognized that the “equitable rule of reason” label originated in a 1976 
House Report for the Copyright Act.184 A House Report does not 
determine whether a doctrine is equitable or legal. More to the point, by 
adopting the House Report’s label, the Court did not intend to declare that 
fair use was an equitable doctrine in the sense that it originated in a court 
of equity. Rather, the context of the Court’s use of equitable indicates that 
the Court was denoting the word’s ordinary meaning of fairness or 
reasonableness.185 Specifically, in the three cases that the Supreme Court 
                                                     
usual injunctive relief with an accounting is prayed for.” (emphasis added)), aff’d, 45 F.2d 119 (2d 
Cir. 1930). 
180. See West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 F. 833, 838–39 (2d Cir. 1910) (explaining 
circumstance wherein equitable court could award damages); 2 STORY, supra note 167, § 794, at 104–05. 
181. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (emphasis added); Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985) (emphasis added); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (emphasis added). 
182. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
183. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. 523 U.S. 340, 347–48 (1998) (setting forth 
test for constitutional jury right). 
184. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448 n.31. The Sony Court stated: 
The House Report expressly stated that the fair use doctrine is an “equitable rule of reason” in 
its explanation of the fair use section: 
Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, 
no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable 
rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts. 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679–80). 
185. The Oxford English Dictionary recognizes two distinct meaning for equitable. See 5 OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 357 (2d ed. 1989). One meaning indicates the fairness and reasonableness of a 
decision or action. See id. (“1. Characterized by equity or fairness. a. Of actions, arrangements, 
decisions, etc.: That is in accordance with equity; fair, just, reasonable.”). Another meaning indicates 
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described fair use as an “equitable rule of reason,” it did so to explain that 
the doctrine should not be applied rigidly but rather that it should be 
applied based on the individual facts of each case.186 Under the meaning 
of fairness or reasonable, the use of equitable in this explanation makes 
sense: because the fair-use doctrine calls for an assessment of whether a 
use is fair or reasonable, no general definition is possible and each case 
must be individually evaluated. The ordinary meaning of equitable fits the 
Court’s explanation. Thus, the Court’s description of fair use as an 
“equitable rule of reason” does not establish that the doctrine is equitable 
for the purpose of a Seventh Amendment analysis. 
It is lastly worth noting that two well-recognized modern authorities on 
the doctrine of fair use entirely disagree with the view that fair-use is an 
equitable doctrine. Professor William Patry stated: “Fair use is not an 
equitable doctrine or an equitable defense. As history reveals, it is a legal 
defense which may be, and frequently is, decided by a jury.”187 Judge 
Pierre Leval further explained: 
A . . . misleading assumption is that fair use is a creature of 
equity. From this assumption it would follow that unclean hands 
and all other equitable considerations are pertinent. Historically 
                                                     
a category of jurisprudence. See id. (“2. Pertaining to the department of jurisprudence called EQUITY. 
Of rights, claims, etc.: Valid in ‘equity’ as distinguished from ‘law’.”).  
186. See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 236 (“The doctrine is an ‘equitable rule of reason,’ which ‘permits 
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very 
creativity which that law is designed to foster.’” (first quoting Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 488; 
and then quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d 
Cir. 1980)); Harper, 471 U.S. at 560 (“[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally 
applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.” 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65)); Sony, 464 U.S. at 448 n.31 (“Although the courts have 
considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept 
has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable 
definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts . . . .” 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65)). In Sony, the Court used the label in two other instances. See 
id., 464 U.S. at 454–55 (“When these factors are all weighed in the ‘equitable rule of reason’ balance, 
we must conclude that this record amply supports the District Court’s conclusion that home time-
shifting is fair use.”); id. at 448 (“That section [of the Copyright Act] identifies various factors that 
enable a court to apply an ‘equitable rule of reason’ analysis to particular claims of infringement.”). 
Neither of these instances suggest that the Court intended to mean that fair use is an equitable doctrine 
in the sense of equity as a category of jurisprudence. Both suggest the ordinary meaning of fairness. 
187. 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:3, at 10–49 (2018) (footnotes omitted); see 
also William Patry, Summary Judgment – Morning Mail + Motion to Strike Palfrey, EON (July 19, 
2009, 9:41 PM), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nesson/2009/07/20/summary-judgment-morning-mail/ 
[https://perma.cc/86XP-M68Z] (“The occasional statements about fair use being an equitable defense 
are, in my opinion ahistorical (Jude Leval agrees).”). 
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this notion is incorrect. Litigation under the Statute of Anne188 
began in the law courts. Although plaintiffs who sought 
injunctions could sue, and did, in the courts of equity, which 
exercised parallel jurisdiction, the fair use doctrine did not arise 
out of equitable considerations.189 
Thus, the conclusion that fair use stands as a doctrine originating in equity 
simply lacks support as a historical matter, and leading modern authorities 
have cast serious doubt on that conclusion. 
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
Even assuming that the Seventh Amendment did not mandate a 
deferential review of fair use, Supreme Court jurisprudence dealing with 
the standard of review for such mixed questions of law and fact indicates 
that this standard of review should govern. Although the Court has 
provided only brief instruction about the standard of review for the fair-
use issue specifically,190 the Court has taught general principles about 
which standard of review should govern mixed questions of law and 
fact.191 This Part examines the Court’s guidance in these two contexts: 
Section III.A examines the Court’s direction on reviewing mixed 
questions of law and fact in U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Village at 
Lakeridge, LLC192; Section III.B examines brief statements in Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises about appellate review of fair 
use.193 
A. U.S. Bank on Mixed Questions 
Recently, the Supreme Court in U.S. Bank addressed the standard of 
review for mixed questions of law and fact.194 At issue in U.S. Bank was 
whether a particular creditor should be classified as an “insider” of a 
debtor.195 The issue raised a mixed question of law and fact: it required 
the district court to apply a legal principle (i.e., a person is considered to 
                                                     
188. The Statute of Anne was the first copyright statute in England, enacted by Parliament in 1710. 
See Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne) 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Gr. Brit.). 
189. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127 (1990).   
190. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 560. 
191. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 960, 966–68 (2018). 
192. See id. 
193. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985). 
194. U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 963. 
195. Id. 
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be a non-statutory insider where he or she conducts a business transaction 
as though the parties are not strangers) to the historical facts of the case 
(i.e., the particular creditor had a romantic relationship with the debtor) in 
order to deduce the creditor’s proper classification.196 The Supreme Court 
considered whether the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling on this issue was 
subject to clear-error or de novo review.197 Ultimately holding the mixed 
question to be subject to clear-error review, the Court taught principles 
that define the review standard for mixed questions.198 It explained: 
[S]ome [mixed questions] require courts to expound on the law, 
particularly by amplifying or elaborating on a broad legal 
standard. When that is so—when applying the law involves 
developing auxiliary legal principles of use in other cases—
appellate courts should typically review a decision de novo. But 
as [Respondent] replies, other mixed questions immerse courts in 
case-specific factual issues—compelling them to marshal and 
weigh evidence, make credibility judgments, and otherwise 
address what we have (emphatically if a tad redundantly) called 
‘multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist 
generalization.’ And when that is so, appellate courts should 
usually review a decision with deference.199 
Thus, the Court outlined two general considerations for determining the 
standard of review for mixed questions. If the analysis involves 
development of auxiliary legal principles that would guide future cases, 
this suggests de novo.200 By contrast, if the analysis involves fact-specific 
issues, addressing a set of diverse and narrow facts that “resist 
generalization,” this suggests a deferential standard.201 
This guidance may suggest contradictory conclusions for the review 
standard of fair use. On the one hand, application of the four fair-use 
factors has resulted in the development of auxiliary legal principles that 
guide future cases. For instance, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,202 
the Supreme Court developed several legal principles under the first 
factor’s inquiry into the purpose of the use—namely, the doctrine of 
transformative use, parody, and its effect on the other statutory factors.203 
                                                     
196. Id. at 967. 
197. Id. at 963. 
198. Id. at 967–68. 
199. Id. at 967 (citations omitted). 
200. See id. 
201. See id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561–62 (1988)). 
202. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
203. See id. at 579–85. 
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In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,204 the Court 
taught legal principles that guide the fourth factor’s inquiry into the 
potential market effect of the use, such as the requirement that a copyright 
holder demonstrate some likelihood of harm where a use is 
noncommercial.205 In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises, the Court articulated a legal principle under the second 
factor’s inquiry into the nature of the copyrighted work: the relevancy of 
a work’s unpublished nature.206 To be sure, appellate courts often develop 
legal principles that guide the fair-use analysis in future cases. According 
to U.S. Bank, this suggests de novo review.207 
On the other hand, it is well established that the facts of fair-use cases 
resist generalization. The Court has repeatedly taught that fair use calls 
for a “case-by-case analysis,” and that that analysis “is not to be simplified 
with bright-line rules.”208 As the Court explained in Sony: 
[T]he endless variety of situations and combinations of 
circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the 
formulation of exact rules in the statute . . . . Beyond a very broad 
statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria 
applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to 
particular situations on a case-by-case basis.209 
Justice Blackmun put it simply: “The inquiry is necessarily a flexible 
one.”210 A flexible, case-by-case doctrine means that courts must not 
determine whether a use is fair based on a generalization of historical 
facts.211 
                                                     
204. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
205. See id. at 451. 
206. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985).  
207. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 960, 967 (2018). 
208. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; Harper, 471 U.S. at 560; Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair 
Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1093 (2007) (“Concerns about the problem of fair use uncertainty have 
intensified recently because fair use has been called upon in a variety of new situations. Wide 
distribution of digital technologies has greatly increased copyright law’s domain while also giving 
rise to a significantly larger pool of potential fair users attracted to the remarkable reproductive and 
adaptive power of these new technologies.”). 
209. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 448–49 n.31 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976)). 
210. See id. at 479–80 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
211. The question of whether a use is fair in copyright law is akin to the question of whether a 
person has acted reasonably in negligence law. Both questions call for an examination of the 
circumstances surrounding the action in question, and whether a defendant acted according to social 
norms. Both resist factual generalizations. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 173, 237 (5th ed. 1984) (recognizing that the question of reasonableness 
in negligence cases is factual in nature). 
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The Federal Circuit concluded otherwise. It opined that fair-use cases 
do not turn on case-specific factual issues. The Federal Circuit reasoned 
that because “historical facts in a fair use inquiry are generally few, 
generally similar from case to case, and rarely debated, resolution of what 
any set of facts means to the fair use determination definitely does not 
‘resist generalization.’”212 This reasoning is problematic. It is true that 
historical facts in a fair-use inquiry are generally few: the history, content, 
and origin of a copyrighted work are usually undisputed, for a defendant’s 
use of the work is either undisputed or assumed arguendo.213 Nevertheless, 
this undisputed nature of the historical facts does not in any way suggest 
that those facts will be similar from case to case. Moreover, even if general 
patterns emerge in fair-use decisions,214 the specific circumstances of each 
use must be evaluated for distinctive nuances.215 For instance, uses of 
copyrighted material that are for news reporting are likely to be fair.216 
Yet if the author of an original photograph is a freelance photographer in 
the business of selling images to news organizations, that factual nuance 
would likely represent an exception to the usual generalization that news-
reporting uses are fair.217 That nuance affects the target market for the 
copyrighted work under the fourth factor.218 Similarly, if a news 
                                                     
212. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 966). 
213. See Snow, Judges Playing Jury, supra note 18, at 493. 
214. Several scholars have well observed and analyzed general patterns emerging in fair-use 
decisions. See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 79–81 (2012) (statistically 
analyzing fair-use decisions to identify favorable factors, such as a use’s employment of new creative 
content in a work, that make fair-use determinations more predictable); Pamela Samuelson, 
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2540–46 (2009) (recognizing patterns in the form 
of “policy-relevant clusters” that provide insight for predicting fair-use decisions); Michael J. 
Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1531–32, 1586–
1676 (2004) (observing social and cultural patterns and practices that suggest a general context that 
can develop frameworks for analyzing fair use). Those patterns may be the basis for judges developing 
additional auxiliary legal principles that will guide the decision-makers who are responsible for 
reaching fair-use determinations—be they jurors or judges. 
215. Consider, for instance, a critical review of a copyrighted work. Quoting lengthy passages from 
the work seems permissible to substantiate a reviewer’s critical opinion. Yet if the reviewer quotes 
the most salient parts of the work (or even summarizes them in great detail), the review may actually 
substitute for the work. The line between criticism and substitution will depend on specific 
circumstances in any given case concerning a critical review. On this point, Justice Story explained 
that discerning between genuine criticism and substitution raises a question “calling for great caution 
and involving great difficulty.” Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 
4,901) (Story, J.).  
216. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (listing news reporting as example of fair-use purpose). 
217. E.g., Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 189–90 (D. Mass. 2013) (denying 
fair use for news organization that used photograph of freelance photographer); see also Samuelson, 
supra note 214, at 2558–65 (outlining factual patterns in fair-use cases concerning news). 
218. See Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 189–90. 
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organization published excerpts of a memoir without permission—say, 
for instance, a president’s memoir about why he issued a controversial 
pardon—the use may not necessarily be deemed a newsworthy purpose.219 
The commercial purpose of publishing the story prior to the copyright 
holder’s publication of the memoir might outweigh the seeming news 
purpose of the use.220 Specific factual nuances must be considered, even 
in applying general patterns that demonstrably suggest fairness or 
infringement. Therefore, flexibility in application is necessary, and 
according to U.S. Bank, this characteristic suggests a deferential 
review.221 
Thus, two characteristics of the fair-use analysis suggest different 
standards of review. It both involves the development of legal principles 
that guide future cases and calls for a case-by-case evaluation. In the face 
of these competing characteristics, which standard of review should 
govern? The answer, it appears, depends on which institution—judge or 
jury—is better positioned to decide the issue. The U.S. Bank Court has 
noted as much, explaining: “When an ‘issue falls somewhere between a 
pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact,’ the standard of review 
often reflects which ‘judicial actor is better positioned’ to make the 
decision.”222 That principle suggests that the jury should decide the issue, 
for the jury appears better positioned to draw the inferences that determine 
fairness.223 As discussed below in Part IV, the diversity of life experiences 
in a jury brings a cultural perspective to the fair-use analysis that appellate 
judges frequently lack, and that perspective is valuable in defining the 
fairness of a use.224 As the better positioned actor, a jury deserves 
deference.225 
Importantly, a deferential standard for jury findings on fair use would 
not prevent courts from developing legal principles in the doctrine. Even 
under the deferential standard, appellate judges could teach legal 
principles that would guide jurors or judges as they analyze certain factual 
                                                     
219. E.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (“The Nation 
went beyond simply reporting uncopyrightable information and actively sought to exploit the headline 
value of its infringement, making a ‘news event’ out of its unauthorized first publication of a noted 
figure’s copyrighted expression.”). 
220. See id. at 561–63. 
221. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 960, 967 (2018). 
222. See id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
223. See discussion supra Part IV. 
224. See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
225. See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
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circumstances. U.S. Bank expressly establishes this point.226 Hence, 
appellate courts need not upset a jury finding merely to explain how to 
apply legal principles in future cases involving similar factual 
circumstances.227 The need for development of auxiliary legal principles 
does not mandate de novo review. 
In sum, U.S. Bank’s mandate for a deferential review of mixed 
questions that call for a case-specific factual analysis applies to the 
doctrine of fair use. Courts may still develop legal principles to guide 
future fair-use decisions while deferring to jury findings. 
B. Harper on Fair Use 
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises.228 The facts concerned a news organization that 
published an article containing excerpts of President Gerald Ford’s 
memoirs.229 The district court held a bench trial and determined that the 
news organization, The Nation, had infringed the copyright in Ford’s 
memoirs.230 In reaching that holding, the district court rejected The 
                                                     
226. See U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 968 n.7 (explaining that under the clear-error standard, “if an 
appellate court someday finds that further refinement of the . . . [substantive-law] standard is 
necessary to maintain uniformity among bankruptcy courts, it may step in to perform that legal 
function”). Recall that in U.S. Bank, the Court held that appellate courts should apply a clear-error 
standard of review on the issue of whether a person is a “non-statutory insider.” Id. at 963. In support 
of this holding, Justice Kennedy emphasized that even under this deferential standard, appellate courts 
could continue to develop the legal standards that govern that issue. Id. at 969 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). He stated:  
As the Court’s opinion makes clear, courts of appeals may continue to elaborate in more detail 
the legal standards that will govern whether a person or entity is a non-statutory insider under 
the Bankruptcy Code. At this stage of the doctrine’s evolution, this ongoing elaboration of the 
principles that underlie non-statutory insider status seems necessary to ensure uniform and 
accurate adjudications in this area. 
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Snow, Judges Playing Jury, supra note 18, at 511–17 
(explaining that a deferential standard of review does not preclude a court from declaring legal 
principles that should guide similar situations in the future).   
227. An example of such continued development of fair use is the Supreme Court’s teaching in 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). There the Court explained 
legal principles that led to the conclusion that recording a television show through home-use VCR 
technology must be fair, even after the district court had held a bench trial and granted fair use for the 
defendants. See id. at 447–55. Sony established a legal rule in the fair-use analysis that would apply 
only in a specific set of facts—VCR recordings of off-the-air broadcasts. 
228. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).  
229. Id. at 541–42. 
230. Id. at 543. 
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Nation’s argument of fair use.231 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the district court.232 
In affirming the district court’s denial of fair use, the Harper Court 
made two statements concerning the procedure for reviewing fair use.233 
Those statements consist of the following two sentences (quoted without 
adding, omitting, or otherwise altering any language of the Court): 
Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact. Pacific & Southern 
Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495, n. 8 (CA11 1984). Where 
the district court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the 
statutory factors, an appellate court ‘need not remand for further 
factfinding . . . , [but] may conclude as a matter of law that [the 
challenged use] do[es] not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted 
work.’ Id. at 1495.234 
The Harper statements make clear that if a district court has found 
historical facts sufficient to perform an analysis under the factors, an 
appellate court may perform its own analysis, thus applying a de novo 
standard to the district court’s analysis.235 It would seem to follow that 
only the historical facts require deference and that findings under the four-
factor analysis do not. And given that the Harper Court never 
distinguished between reviewing a trial judge and a jury, it is further 
arguable that an appellate court need not defer to a jury in reviewing its 
finding of fairness.236 
This interpretation of Harper, which I criticize below, has found favor 
with some courts.237 Courts applying this interpretation (prior to Oracle) 
                                                     
231. Id. at 543, 569. 
232. Id. at 569. 
233. See id. at 560. 
234. Id. I refer to these statements as “the Harper statements.” 
235. Id. 
236. The Oracle Court interpreted the Harper statements to mean: “so long as the record is 
‘sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors,’ we may reweigh on appeal the inferences to be 
drawn from that record.” Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Mattel Inc. v. 
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
237. See, e.g., Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 800–06 (relying on Harper to treat the issue of fair use as a 
pure legal question on summary judgment); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, 149 F.3d 
987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998) (same); Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137, 
141–46 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Although ‘[f]air use is a mixed question of law and fact,’ this court has on a 
number of occasions ‘resolved fair use determinations at the summary judgment stage’ where, as here, 
there are no genuine issues of material fact.” (citation omitted)) (engaging in four-factor analysis); 
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) (relying on Harper to treat the issue of fair use as 
a pure legal question on summary judgment); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 
855 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (same), aff’d, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Television 
Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (same); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. 
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have all done so in the context of resolving whether to decide the fair-use 
issue as a matter of law on summary judgment.238 Case in point—and 
relevant to the Federal Circuit’s reasoning—is Fisher v. Dees,239 where 
the Ninth Circuit considered whether a defendant was entitled to a jury 
trial on the issue of fair use.240 The Fisher Court interpreted the Harper 
statements to mean that the “ultimate conclusions to be drawn from the 
admitted facts” constitute “judgments [that] are legal in nature,” such that 
judges can analyze the historical facts “without usurping the function of 
the jury.”241 Other Ninth Circuit opinions followed Fisher’s lead in 
deciding the fair-use issue on summary judgment, interpreting the Harper 
statements as providing a basis for courts to treat the fair-use analysis as 
raising pure legal issues for a judge to decide.242 
In Oracle, the Federal Circuit relied on Fisher and the other Ninth 
Circuit cases to conclude that the court should treat the fair-use analysis 
as an issue of law subject to de novo review.243 Notably, though, neither 
the Ninth Circuit nor any other circuit has ever held the standard of review 
to be de novo for a jury finding on the fair-use issue. Indeed, Ninth Circuit 
precedent (along with precedent of other circuits)244 applies a deferential 
standard of review to jury findings on this issue.245 Nevertheless, the 
                                                     
Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 972 F.3d 
1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
238. See cases cited supra note 237. 
239. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). 
240. Id. at 436. 
241. Id. (noting also that the Harper statements “completely undercut” the argument that a jury 
should decide the fair-use issue). 
242. See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2013) (relying on the 
Harper statements as justification for deciding the issue of fair use where the historical facts are 
decided); L.A. News, 149 F.3d at 993 (same); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1468 (9th Cir. 
1988) (same).  
243. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
244. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“Applying the statutory factors from 17 U.S.C. § 107, we conclude that the result reached by the jury 
was not unreasonable.”); N.Y. Univ. v. Planet Earth Found., 163 F. App’x 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]he evidence also supports the jury’s finding of fair use, under the four-factored analysis 
prescribed by statute. While [the copyright owner] vehemently argues, for instance, that [the 
defendant’s] display of copyrighted material at a fund-raiser was of a commercial nature, this issue is 
the jury’s to decide.” (citations omitted)); Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 
410–11 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences therefrom, 
when viewed through the lens of the statutory fair use factors, support the jury’s fair use finding.”). 
245. See Fiset v. Sayles, No. 90-16548, 1992 WL 110263, at *4 (9th Cir. May 22, 1992) (applying 
substantial-evidence standard to uphold jury verdict on copyright claim involving fair use). Since 
Harper, the Ninth Circuit has never held that Harper requires a de novo standard in reviewing a jury 
verdict on fair use, suggesting that its precedent prior to Harper (applying a deferential standard) 
would govern the issue. See Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) 
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Federal Circuit interpreted Fisher as having “clarified” that the jury role 
is only with respect to historical facts and not the analysis of those facts—
even though Ninth Circuit precedent expressly defers to the jury’s 
ultimate finding of fairness.246 Regardless of this fact, the Harper 
statements have served as justification for treating the fair-use analysis as 
raising only legal issues for judges to decide. 
On reflection, this interpretation of the Harper statements appears too 
broad for the simple reason that the Harper Court was reviewing a judge’s 
finding at a bench trial—not a jury finding.247 To impute the Harper 
statements to a jury finding would read into the statements a proposition 
that goes beyond what the Court actually did. Such a reading would step 
well outside of established copyright precedent at the time of Harper.248 
For instance, three years prior to Harper, the Second Circuit had reversed 
a trial judge’s application of the fair-use doctrine on summary judgment, 
remanding the case for jury consideration.249 The Second Circuit 
specifically declared that fair use “raise[s] essentially factual 
issues . . . [that] are normally questions for the jury.”250 If the Harper 
statements mean that the fair-use analysis represents pure legal issues for 
                                                     
(“We conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found that Hustler’s 
publication of the photograph was not a fair use.”); Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 407–08 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (“While the statutory standards [of fair use] are not precisely applicable to the facts at bar, 
because there was evidence that the . . . [defendant’s] use was neither commercially exploitive of the 
copyright, nor commercially exploitive of the copyright holder’s market, the jury’s verdict is certainly 
supported by substantial evidence.”). 
246. Compare Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1194–95 (relying on Fisher to conclude that a jury only finds 
historical facts in fair-use cases, in response to Ninth Circuit precedent deferring to a jury finding), 
with Jartech, 666 F.2d at 407–08 (deferring to the jury’s ultimate finding of fair use). 
247. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 543 (1985). 
248. E.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Since the issue of fair use is 
one of fact, the clearly erroneous standard of review is appropriate.” (citation omitted)); Meeropol v. 
Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (“It was error to hold that as a matter of law the fair use 
defense was available to defendants . . . . The determination whether the use under these 
circumstances was substantial should have been made by the trier of fact in the light of all relevant 
facts.”); Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957) (“[T]he issue of fair 
use is a question of fact. We cannot say that the Master’s finding in this respect is clearly erroneous.” 
(citation omitted)); Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943) (“As 
fair use is to be determined by a consideration of all the evidence in the case, so, likewise, is the 
question of infringement one of fact to be solved by a study of the evidence.”); see also Piper Aircraft 
Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 936 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring) (“[C]lear error 
has been held to be the proper standard for reviewing determinations of most mixed questions of law 
and fact in intellectual-property cases—such questions as similarity, copying, access, and fair use in 
copyright cases . . . .”). 
249. See DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982). 
250. Id. 
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judges to determine, Harper would have overruled this Second Circuit 
holding. 
Given the established and active history of courts treating fair use as a 
question for the jury that appellate courts review deferentially, it seems 
highly unlikely that the Harper Court would effect a monumental change 
in the law of fair use through its brief statements about appellate review.251 
Did the Harper Court intend to change the four-factor analysis in fair use 
from a jury issue (reviewed for substantial evidence) to a judge issue 
(reviewed de novo)? The question was not even before the Court.252 
Neither party had briefed it.253 The proposition that the Court intended this 
change in the law ignores the context of the opinion, especially 
considering that the author of the opinion, Justice O’Connor, is well 
known for her adherence to precedent.254 Hence, to interpret the Harper 
statements as changing fair use from a jury issue to a judge issue would 
ignore history—history that precedes the Constitution and continues right 
up to Harper. An intent to effect such a change in the law of fair use is 
patently absent in Harper. 
Further support for this view arises from the case on which the Harper 
Court relied for its quoted statements—Pacific & Southern Co. v. 
                                                     
251. In the year prior to Harper, the Court decided Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In Sony, the Court reviewed a trial court’s decision that applied the fair-
use doctrine to home recordings of copyrighted television broadcasts. Id. at 425–26. In upholding the 
bench-trial decision, the Sony Court appears to have applied a deferential standard, although the Court 
was not explicit in the standard that it applied: “[T]his record amply supports the District Court’s 
conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.” Id. at 456. At the same time, the Sony Court did 
articulate new legal principles to guide the fair-use analysis, see id. at 447–55, exemplifying 
U.S. Bank’s admonition that appellate courts can teach legal principles even while deferring to a 
district court. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 960, 968 
n.7 (2018); discussion supra Section III.A. 
252. See Brief for Petitioners, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 
(1985) (No. 83-1632), 1984 WL 565994, at *i (stating questions presented by appeal). 
253. See id.; Brief for Respondents, Harper, 471 U.S. 539 (No. 83-1632), 1984 WL 565761, at *i 
(stating questions presented by appeal). 
254. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (O’Connor, J.) 
(“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over 
time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.” (citation omitted)). 
Since Harper, Judge Posner has observed in passing that he sees no reason why courts have 
instituted “plenary review” (de novo review) in copyright cases dealing with fair use. See United 
States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is easy to cite a string of cases in which 
a court describes the standard of review for a mixed question of nonconstitutional law and fact, such 
as fair use in a copyright case . . . as being plenary; but we are not aware of any case which explains 
why such an issue requires plenary review . . . .”). 
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Duncan.255 Like Harper, Pacific was a bench trial.256 There, the trial judge 
refused to recognize fair use unless the use was inherently productive or 
creative.257 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this per se rule.258 The 
per se rule appears to have constituted a clear error in the trial judge’s 
application of the four factors. So rather than remanding the case for the 
trial judge to correctly perform the four-factor analysis, the Eleventh 
Circuit went ahead and analyzed the factors itself, applying a non-
deferential review.259 This made sense, for the Eleventh Circuit could 
draw inferences from the historical facts just as well as the trial judge 
could. Notably, in applying its independent review of the four-factor 
analysis, the Eleventh Circuit relied on a Second Circuit case, Triangle 
Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.260 In Triangle, the 
Second Circuit reversed a trial judge’s decision that a use was infringing 
on a motion for a permanent injunction.261 The Second Circuit expressly 
recognized that in most instances a trial judge’s finding on the issue of 
fair use is subject to a clearly erroneous standard.262 Yet because the trial 
judge in that instance had failed to consider three of the four factors, the 
Second Circuit believed that it was “more free” to determine the question 
of fair use.263 In both Pacific and Triangle, the trial judge had decided the 
issue of fair use, and in doing so, appears to have committed a clear error 
in applying the four factors. 
Harper relied on Pacific for its proposition that an appellate court can 
apply an independent review, which relied on Triangle for the same 
proposition. Importantly, though, Pacific and Triangle were unusual for 
their time.264 Given their unusualness, Harper’s proposition, which stems 
                                                     
255. 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984); see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (relying on Pac. & S. Co., 744 F.2d at 1495). 
256. Pac. & S. Co., 744 F.2d at 1494. 
257. Id. at 1495. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. (relying on Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 
(5th Cir. 1980)). 
261. Triangle, 626 F.2d at 1178 (affirming judgment on fair use grounds, which the district court 
had denied). The court of appeals reviewed the trial court’s ruling on motions for preliminary and 
permanent injunctions. Id. at 1171. The district court explained that its ruling on the permanent 
injunction followed its adjudication on the merits. See Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder 
Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff’d, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
262. Triangle, 626 F.2d at 1175 (“We assume without deciding that a lower Court’s finding that 
there was or was not fair use is normally a finding of fact subject to the clearly erroneous rule of 
F.R.Civ.P. 52(a).”). 
263. Id. 
264. See cases cited supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
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from Pacific and Triangle, would appear applicable only in the 
circumstance common to all three cases. The only circumstance common 
to all three cases is that appellate judges are reviewing a trial judge (and 
not in the context of summary judgment), so that appears to be the 
circumstance for applying the Harper statements.265 Indeed, prior to and 
since Harper, in every instance that an appellate court has applied de novo 
review to a district court’s four-factor analysis, a judge has performed that 
analysis at the district-court level—with the exception of Oracle.266 Other 
than in Oracle, no appellate court has ever applied a de novo standard in 
reviewing a jury finding on the issue of fair use—either before or after 
Harper.267 
Although the case law supports limiting the Harper statements to a 
review of a trial judge, this conclusion raises a simple question: Why 
would the Court apply a different standard of review for a trial judge than 
for a jury? The answer is twofold. First, as discussed below, a jury 
deserves deference because its diversity of life experiences and values 
gives it a perspective that is valuable in deciding whether a use is fair.268 
Trial judges lack that perspective. Second, the fair-use analysis does not 
call for credibility judgments.269 Credibility judgments are usually 
                                                     
265. Deciding fair use on summary judgment would imply that the four-factor analysis involves 
judges deciding legal issues. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2725, at 410–12 (3d ed. 1998) 
(“The fact that difficult questions of law exist or that the parties differ on the legal conclusions to be 
drawn from the facts is not in and of itself a ground for denying summary judgment . . . .”). The 
Supreme Court has never ruled whether courts may decide fair use on summary judgment. In 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), the Court did analyze the issue of fair use 
in the context of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment. However, the copyright owner did not 
raise the issue about whether the fair-use analysis raises issues of fact inappropriate for summary 
judgment. See Brief on the Merits for Respondent, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 
(1994) (No. 92-1292), 1993 WL 391058, at *i (articulating question presented on appeal). The 
Campbell Court therefore did not consider the issue of whether courts may decide fair use on summary 
judgment. 
266. See Snow, Judges Playing Jury, supra note 18, at 522–34 (reciting cases of district and 
appellate courts treating fair use as an issue of law). 
267. See id. 
268. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
269. One might argue that Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), precludes a 
distinction in review standards that is based on the absence of credibility assessment. In Anderson, 
the Court made a statement rejecting an argument that appellate courts “may exercise de novo review 
over findings not based on credibility determinations.” Id. at 574. Such a distinction, the Court 
explained, is not present in Rule 52(a), which states that “findings of fact shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous.” Id. 
The statement in Anderson does not govern the issue of which review standard applies to fair use. 
First, the Anderson statement was dicta—a point explicitly recognized by Justice Blackmun in his 
concurrence. See id. at 581–82 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Specifically, the Court reversed the 
appellate court for failing to give deference to the district court’s discernment of witness credibility. 
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exclusive to the trial level, where a trial judge or jury can observe verbal 
and nonverbal behavior.270 Yet determining the fairness of a use does not 
require judgments about witness credibility. The determination involves 
assessing whether the purpose of a use suggests fairness, whether the 
nature of a copyrighted work suggests strong protection, whether the 
amount and substantiality of the use is significant, and whether the use 
could negatively affect a potential market. Given the absence of 
credibility judgments, a trial judge is no more qualified to make the fair-
use value judgments than is an appellate judge.271 Therefore, good reason 
exists to distinguish between the standards that apply in reviewing a jury’s 
decision and a trial judge’s decision on the issue of fair use.272 
IV. SUPERIORITY OF JURIES IN DECIDING FAIR USE 
Consider the claim that juries are better positioned than judges to 
decide fair use. This claim may seem untenable in view of the highly-
educated, legally-trained, and well-experienced backgrounds of federal 
judges, as compared to the often minimal education level and legal 
experience in an average jury.273 To be sure, if the fair-use analysis 
                                                     
See id. at 577. Hence, the Court’s statement about a review standard for an issue on which the district 
court does not make credibility assessments does not address the actual issue that the Anderson Court 
was considering. Its statement was therefore dicta. Second, the Anderson Court made this statement 
in the context of reviewing a question of fact—not a mixed question of law and fact. See id. at 573. 
Unlike questions of fact, mixed questions do not always fall within the ambit of Rule 52(a). See 
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 960, 966–67 (2018) 
(recognizing distinction in appellate review of well-settled issues of fact, which are subject to clearly-
erroneous standard under Rule 52, and mixed questions of law and fact). According to the U.S. Bank 
Court, determining the standard of review for mixed questions may require asking, among other 
things, whether there are credibility assessments. See id. at 967 (“[O]ther mixed questions immerse 
courts in case-specific factual issues—compelling them to . . . make credibility judgments . . . .”). 
Thus, the Anderson Court’s admonition (in dicta) against the absence of credibility assessments 
serving as a basis for the standard of review for questions of fact does not imply that the absence of 
credibility assessments may not serve as a basis for distinguishing between the standard of review for 
a bench trial and the standard of review for a jury trial on the mixed question of fair use. 
270. See United States v. Smith, 576 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing reasons for deferring 
to a trial judge on credibility determinations). 
271. Cf. Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In considering 
substantial similarity between two items [under a claim of copyright infringement], we review the 
district court’s findings de novo—not on the clearly erroneous standard—because what is required is 
only a visual comparison of the works, rather than credibility, which we are in as good a position to 
decide as was the district court.”). 
272. Cf. Yurman Design, Inc. v. Paj, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing 
distinction between standard of review on the issue of substantial similarity as between a jury finding 
(substantial evidence) and a bench trial (de novo)).  
273. See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis 
and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 505 (1997) (“The modern juror is often relatively 
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represented an exercise for the highly educated, benefiting from rigorous 
legal thinking and expertise, judges would be much more qualified to 
make the assessment. For that matter, one might expect agreement among 
judges as to whether uses were fair. But, of course, judges do not agree on 
this issue.274 Apparently, education, judicial experience, and legal training 
do not necessarily result in consistent outcomes.275 This is because fair 
use is not an exercise that necessarily benefits from these characteristics 
of judges.276 As discussed below, the question of whether a use is fair 
depends on the social values, norms, and perspectives of the decision-
maker. As highly educated and legally trained as judges may be, they 
                                                     
uneducated compared to the general population. The modern selection process is skewed in favor of 
selection from the less well-educated and experienced segment of society.”). 
274. Judge Pierre Leval of the Second Circuit explained the inconsistency of judges on this issue: 
Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. Earlier decisions provide little basis 
for predicting later ones. Reversals and divided courts are commonplace. The opinions reflect 
widely differing notions of the meaning of fair use. Decisions are not governed by consistent 
principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns. 
Leval, supra note 189, at 1106–07; see also NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 66 
(2008) (recognizing “inconsistent application” of fair-use doctrine). But see Barton Beebe, An 
Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 575 (2008) 
(conducting statistical analysis of fair-use cases and concluding that “our fair use case law, at least 
outside of the cases that reached the Supreme Court (and our casebooks), has not been marked by 
especially high reversal, dissent, or appeal rates”). 
The case histories of the Supreme Court’s three fair-use decisions all consist of the Court reversing 
an appeals court that had reversed a district court. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569 (1994), rev’g 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’g 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991); Harper 
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), rev’g 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), 
rev’g 557 F. Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984), rev’g 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’g 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979). In two 
of these decisions, the Court itself was fractured: 6-3 and 5-4. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 539 (voting 6-
3); Sony, 464 U.S. at 417 (voting 5-4). Tellingly, in the 5-4 Sony decision, Justice O’Connor switched 
her vote, originally believing that the defendant’s use was infringing, but ultimately concluding it to 
be fair. See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 933–41 (2005). 
275. Perhaps this is the reason that Professors David Nimmer and Peter Menell have observed 
judges consistently voicing a preference to send the issue of fair use to the jury. See Nimmer, supra 
note 110, at 590–91. They made this observation based on annual Intellectual Property Seminars 
held at the Federal Judicial Center in Berkeley, California, where forty judges gather each year to 
discuss intellectual property topics, with a large segment devoted to fair use. Id. Professor Nimmer 
explained: 
Prof. Menell and I have experienced a fascinating give-and-take with the assembled appellate 
judges, district judges, and magistrate judges. Our concern with the purity of copyright doctrine 
and its incremental development in a precedential system initially led us to resist jury 
determinations of fair use, apart from their role in pinpointing areas in which dispute has arisen 
as to historical facts. When we articulated that proposition over the course of years, we 
consistently met an implacable wall of resistance. If there are issues in the case that require a 
jury to be impaneled, the judges have told us countless times, then that jury must be meaningfully 
empowered. 
Id. at 591. 
276. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
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appear no more qualified than juries to make the sort of value judgments 
that define fair use. Indeed, judges appear less qualified. Whereas a judge 
draws from only one set of views and life experiences, a jury draws from 
a pool of citizens, which yields a multiplicity of life experiences that shape 
value judgments and cultural understandings.277 The diversity of 
viewpoints in a jury well suits the sort of subjective judgment that 
determines fair use. 
The argument that juries are better at deciding fair use thus relies on 
two premises: first, the fair-use analysis often raises issues that hinge on 
social values and societal perspectives, turning on subjective opinion; and 
second, a jury’s diverse life experiences are valuable in deciding those 
issues. This Part examines these premises. Section IV.A examines the 
issues that the fair-use doctrine raises. It illustrates the subjective nature 
of these issues by explaining the questions that a decision-maker must 
consider in Oracle. Section IV.B argues that the diversity of juries makes 
them better positioned than judges to decide these subjective issues. It also 
observes that the subjectivity of the issues can give rise to external biases 
affecting judgment, and that judges are more likely to be affected by those 
biases than are juries. 
A. Subjectivity in Fair Use 
Recall the four statutory factors that guide the fair-use analysis.278 In 
applying those factors, a decision-maker must draw inferences to 
conclude whether a use is fair.279 As discussed below, those inferences 
call for judgments that often involve subjective opinion, which is based 
on social values and societal perspectives. The sections below describe 
these sorts of judgments that arise under each of the four factors and 
consider them specifically in Oracle. 
                                                     
277. The Supreme Court’s observation in Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout is instructive on this 
point: 
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education and men of little 
education, men of learning and men whose learning consists only in what they have themselves 
seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, 
apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw a unanimous 
conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is 
assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, that they 
can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single 
judge . . . . [W]hen the facts are disputed, or when they are not disputed, but different minds 
might honestly draw different conclusions from them, the case must be left to the jury for their 
determination. 
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664–65 (1873). 
278. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
279. Id. 
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1. Character and Purpose 
A decision-maker must assess whether the character and the purpose of 
a defendant’s use suggests fairness.280 Although the Copyright Act 
provides examples of fair purposes (i.e., nonprofit education, criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research), the Act 
fails to provide any guidance about the process for determining whether a 
purpose suggests fairness.281 Nor does it provide any examples or 
guidance about what constitutes a fair “character.” The Supreme Court, 
however, has given some instruction on this factor.282 The Court has 
explained that a purpose suggests fairness where a defendant alters 
copyrighted expression for a purpose that “transforms” the original work 
by imparting a new meaning, expression, or message.283 Furthermore, the 
Court has taught that other factors become less significant where a 
defendant’s use is highly transformative, such as in a parody of a 
copyrighted work.284 With respect to the character of a use, the Court has 
clarified that the propriety of the defendant’s conduct is relevant, and that 
fair use presumes “good faith and fair dealing.”285 
Although this instruction is helpful, the decision-maker must still 
exercise broad discretion in deciding whether the first factor favors fair 
use. The decision-maker must determine whether a use is sufficiently 
distinctive from the original copyrighted work to constitute a 
transformative purpose. And even if the purpose is transformative, the 
decision-maker must determine whether the defendant used more 
expression than was necessary to accomplish the transformative 
purpose.286 With respect to a use’s character, a decision-maker must 
determine whether a defendant’s conduct suggests impropriety. These 
types of judgments call for a decision-maker to comprehend and compare 
                                                     
280. See id. § 107(1). 
281. See id. 
282. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561–62 (1985). 
283. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79. 
284. See id. at 579–81. 
285. Harper, 471 U.S. at 562 (quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 
(S.D.N.Y 1968)). 
286. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581, 589 (“The fact that parody can claim legitimacy for some 
appropriation does not, of course, tell either parodist or judge much about where to draw the 
line . . . . [P]arody, like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged 
case by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law.”). 
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meaning and nuance in expression.287 They require an application of 
social norms. 
Turning to Google’s use of the API packages, the first fair-use factor 
may reasonably be construed as suggesting either fairness or 
infringement. As an initial matter, a decision-maker must determine 
whether Google’s use is commercial288 (without having any definition of 
“commercial” from Congress or the Court).289 On the one hand, Google 
provides Android to its users free of charge, distributing the operating 
system through an open-source license.290 From this perspective, the use 
would not seem to be commercial. On the other hand, Google used the 37 
packages in order to make the Android platform more attractive to 
smartphone-app developers.291 More developers programming Android 
apps means more apps available for consumption, and more apps 
consumed means more revenue for Google.292 The first factor thus raises 
the question: Does Google use the 37 packages for a commercial purpose? 
Tellingly, this question does not call for a vigorous exercise of the intellect 
as much as a normative judgment about the meaning of commercial in this 
specific context. 
Even if the use is commercial, the first factor requires further 
consideration of whether Google transformed the 37 packages that it 
copied. On the one hand, by employing the 37 packages in the new context 
of smartphones, Google added new code, instructions, and other new 
packages to the Android operating system. Arguably this use gives the 37 
packages a new meaning.293 This argument draws strength from the fact 
                                                     
287. See generally STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS 226–78 (W. Sidney Allen et al. eds., 1983) 
(explaining that meaning in language derives from social conventions and that meanings of language 
change as conventions change). 
288. The Federal Circuit characterized the question of whether Google’s use was commercial in 
nature as a question of historical fact. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2018). But that 
characterization does not appear correct. Reasonable minds may disagree over whether a use’s 
purpose is to serve a commercial end. Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 562 (1985) (conducting first-factor fair-use analysis and describing purpose of article under 
consideration as “arguably [] news,” without making an absolute determination as to whether the 
article did in fact serve a purpose of providing news (emphasis added)). 
289. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2018). Compare Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984) (recognizing that recording television programs “for private home use must 
be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity”), with A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding private copying of music from website to be commercial 
use—even in the absence of “direct economic benefit”—on grounds that copies were “made to save 
the expense of purchasing authorized copies”). 
290. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1197. 
291. Id. at 1198. 
292. See id. 
293. See id. at 1197, 1199.  
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that the Java API has a utilitarian function (as contrasted with creative 
expression),294 and functional aspects of expression do not receive 
copyright protection.295 So in promoting the function of the Java API, 
Google appears to have transformed the minimally expressive element of 
Java API so that it could be used in a new sort of platform—
smartphones.296 
On the other hand, Google failed to change the expression of the 37 
Java API packages.297 Copying expression into a new platform 
(smartphones) without any alteration arguably does not seem 
transformative.298 For instance, copying music from an analogue record 
into an MP3 format so that it may be downloaded for free on a website 
does not appear to transform the original song.299 It merely changes the 
format of the expression and the platform on which the expression is 
offered.300 In the same way, it is arguable that Google has not transformed 
the Java API by merely moving it into the smartphone platform.301 
Google’s use might also reflect either a good-faith or a bad-faith 
character. Google decided to use the Java API without seeking permission 
                                                     
294. See id. at 1199. 
295. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery . . . .”); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding 
that a menu command hierarchy in software constituted an uncopyrightable “method of operation”); 
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524–26 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that 
functional aspects of computer programs are not protectable and that based in part on this reason, 
copying some software may constitute a fair use).  
296. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1199–201. Ninth Circuit precedent well establishes the 
reasonableness of this conclusion. See Sony Comput. Entm’t v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606–
08 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing, in fair-use analysis, the transformative nature of using an existing 
operating system’s functional aspects for the purpose of making a video-game platform interoperable 
with the personal computer); Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1523 (“Accolade’s identification of the 
functional requirements for Genesis compatibility has led to an increase in the number of 
independently designed video game programs offered for use with the Genesis console. It is precisely 
this growth in creative expression, based on the dissemination of other creative works and the 
unprotected ideas contained in those works, that the Copyright Act was intended to promote.”). 
Professors Pamela Samuelson and Clark Asay have voiced strong arguments in support of the 
transformative nature of Google’s use. See Pamela Samuelson & Clark D. Asay, Saving Software’s 
Fair Use Future, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 535, 553–57 (2018) (interpreting Connectix and Accolade 
as supporting the conclusion that “reusing APIs can serve innovative technological purposes”). 
297. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1201. 
298. Id. 
299. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding 
district court’s conclusion that “downloading MP3 files does not transform the copyrighted work”). 
300. See id. (“Courts have been reluctant to find fair use when an original work is merely 
retransmitted in a different medium.”). 
301. See id. 
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from Oracle, apparently realizing that Oracle might object.302 Yet Google 
believed that the customary practice of the software industry would allow 
it to use the API packages.303 In view of these facts, does the character of 
Google’s use reflect good or bad faith? And if so, how should this factor 
weigh in the analysis of the first factor? It seems unquestionable that this 
first factor raises issues over which reasonable minds might disagree.304 
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
A decision-maker must assess whether the nature of the copyrighted 
work suggests fairness or infringement.305 As already stated, if the 
copyrighted work consists of content that is either highly creative or yet 
unpublished, the second factor suggests that the use is infringing, whereas 
if the copyrighted work consists of content that is historical, functional, or 
informational, this factor suggests that the use is fair.306 Although the 
inquiry into whether a work is unpublished appears objective, the inquiry 
into whether content reflects more creativity than factual or functional 
information can introduce subjective judgment.307 
                                                     
302. See Opening Brief and Addendum for Oracle America, Inc. at 10–13, Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 
1179, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 17-1118), 2017 WL 679347, at *10–13. 
303. See Oracle III, No. 10-03561, 2016 WL 3181206, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2018), rev’d, 886 
F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
304. Prior to the jury trial, the Federal Circuit entertained an argument from Oracle that no 
reasonable jury could find Google’s use to be fair. See Oracle II, 750 F.3d 1339, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). The Federal Circuit rejected that argument. See id. at 1377. Interestingly, the Federal Circuit 
explained: “[W]e find that due respect for the limit of our appellate function requires that we remand 
the fair use question for a new trial. First, although it is undisputed that Google’s use of the API 
packages is commercial, the parties disagree on whether its use is ‘transformative.’” Id. at 1376. 
305. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2018); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) 
(“This factor calls for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright 
protection than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former 
works are copied.”). 
306. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (citing creativity as element in determining fairness under 
second factor); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (second 
factor considers whether work concerns factual nature); id. (“The fact that a work is unpublished is a 
critical element of its ‘nature.’”); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (“The second factor in the fair use analysis ‘recognizes that creative works are “closer to 
the core of intended copyright protection” than informational and functional works.’” (quoting 
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586)). 
307. Consider the memoirs of President Gerald Ford, which described events in his presidency, 
including his pardon of former President Richard Nixon. On the one hand, this work seems like a 
historical account that merits less protection under factor two. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 594 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (characterizing manuscript of President Ford as “informational work” worthy of less 
copyright protection under factor two (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 497 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))). On the other hand, the manuscript contains 
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Applied to Oracle, the second factor raises the question of whether the 
Java API reflects creative expression. On the one hand, the original 
creator of the Java API made choices that organized the pre-written 
programs into specific groupings, known as the packages.308 Those 
choices were not dictated solely by functional considerations, suggesting 
an element of creativity in the grouping of packages.309 Given that Oracle 
could have organized the packages in any number of ways, the particular 
organization of Java API arguably reflects a “highly creative” choice.310 
On the other hand, the functional aspect of the packages suggests minimal 
creativity.311 Specifically, the Java programming structure represents a 
functional operating system, and the Copyright Act specifically exempts 
a “system” from receiving copyright protection.312 Although courts have 
held that a computer operating system is not per se uncopyrightable,313 
courts have also recognized that operational functions of a computer 
program receive thin protection.314 The evidence can thus be reasonably 
interpreted to support contrasting views. 
                                                     
“subjective descriptions” and “individualized expression,” suggesting creativity, and thereby greater 
protection under factor two. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 564 (recognizing that President Ford’s 
manuscript contains subjective expression deserving strong copyright protection under factor two).   
308. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
309. Id. at 1204. 
310. Oracle III, No. 10-03561, 2016 WL 3181206, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2018), rev’d, 886 
F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The district court explained the reasonableness of a jury’s view that 
Google’s use was transformative as follows:  
Android did not merely adopt the Java platform wholesale as part of a broader software platform 
without any changes. Instead, it integrated selected elements, namely declarations from 37 
packages to interface with all new implementing code optimized for mobile smartphones and 
added entirely new Java packages written by Google itself. This enabled a purpose distinct from 
the desktop purpose of the copyrighted works—or so our jury could reasonably have found. 
Id. at *9. 
311. Id. at *10 (“Our jury could reasonably have found that, while the declaring code and SSO 
were creative enough to qualify for copyright protection, functional considerations predominated in 
their design, and thus Factor Two was not a strong factor in favor of Oracle after all.”); see also 
Samuelson & Asay, supra note 296, at 558–61 (arguing that because computer-program APIs are 
functional, they should be subject to broader fair uses). 
312. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.” (emphasis added)). 
313. See, e.g., Apple Comput. Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(rejecting argument that computer operating system cannot be copyrighted). 
314. See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446–47 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(recognizing that graphical user interface of Apple operating system receives only “thin” copyright 
protection, such that infringement could occur “only if the works as a whole are virtually identical”); 
Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The essentially utilitarian 
nature of a computer program further complicates the task of distilling its idea from its expression.”). 
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3. Amount and Substantiality of Portion Used 
A decision-maker must assess whether the amount that a defendant 
used, as well as the substantiality of that amount, suggests fairness or 
infringement.315 If a defendant uses a significant quantity, or alternatively 
uses content that is valuable in the original copyrighted work, this factor 
suggests infringement.316 Importantly, this inquiry must consider whether 
the amount and substantiality that a defendant uses may be justified in 
view of the purpose of that use.317 Whether the quantity of content used 
reflects a significant amount may be debatable.318 Whether that content 
reflects a valuable portion of the copyrighted work calls for a judgment 
about content value, which seems inherently subjective. And whether this 
amount and value may be justified because of the use’s purpose introduces 
further subjectivity into the analysis.319 
Applied to Oracle, the third factor raises the question of whether the 
37 packages constitute a significant portion of the 166 packages in the 
Java API. This translates to Google having copied over 20% of the Java 
API packages. Yet at the same time, the actual code that Google copied 
consisted of only “a tiny fraction of one percent of the [Java API].”320 So, 
has Google copied a significant amount? As to substantiality, the 37 
packages represent an organizational characteristic of Java API that would 
ensure interoperability between Android and the Java programming, 
attractive for Android app developers. Consequently, the 37 packages 
seem qualitatively substantial. On the other hand, Google seems to have 
copied only so much as was necessary to accomplish its purpose of 
preserving the interoperability. Arguably Google used no more than was 
                                                     
As mentioned in Section I.B.2, the district court in Oracle held that the Java API is not copyrightable. 
See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1185. The Federal Circuit then reversed that holding. See Oracle II, 750 
F.3d 1339, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
315. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
316. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–65 (1985).  
317. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
318. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986) (“There are no absolute 
rules as to how much of a copyrighted work may be copied and still be considered a fair use.”). 
319. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2014) (“For some purposes, it 
may be necessary to copy the entire copyrighted work, in which case Factor Three does not weigh 
against a finding of fair use.”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (“If 
Arriba only copied part of the image, it would be more difficult to identify it, thereby reducing the 
usefulness of the visual search engine.”). 
320. See Oracle III, No. 10-03561, 2016 WL 3181206, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2018), rev’d, 
886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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necessary to transform the work.321 How substantial are the 37 packages 
in the Java API? The evidence can be reasonably interpreted to support 
either view. 
4. Potential Market Effect 
A decision-maker must assess whether the defendant’s use negatively 
affects the market for, or value of, a copyrighted work, including any 
potential markets.322 In assessing this factor, the decision-maker must 
contemplate the hypothetical situation of the defendant’s use becoming 
widespread.323 If the use would result in either actual or potential market 
harm, the decision-maker must then determine whether that harm results 
from substitution with the original work or, alternatively, from criticism 
of the original work—the former threat suggesting infringement and the 
latter threat suggesting fairness.324 In considering a use that threatens a 
potential market, the decision-maker must determine whether that 
potential market reflects a traditional, reasonable, or likely-to-be-
developed market.325 Furthermore, a decision-maker must decide whether 
an established licensing market actually comprises a market for others to 
make fair uses of the work, such that a negative effect on the licensing 
market would not suggest infringement.326 Hence, this factor calls for 
                                                     
321. Cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589 (“[W]e think the Court of Appeals correctly suggested that ‘no 
more was taken than necessary,’ but just for that reason, we fail to see how the copying can be 
excessive in relation to its parodic purpose, even if the portion taken is the original’s ‘heart.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
322. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2018). The Federal Circuit viewed the question of whether Google 
caused harm to “potential markets” of Oracle as a question of historical fact. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 
1179, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2018). But that does not seem correct. Whether a potential market even exists 
is based on inferences of what the actual market is. Whether a defendant harms that market is further 
removed from an actual, verifiable state of affairs. Professor David Nimmer aptly describes this 
inquiry as raising “[q]uestions of what might have been.” Nimmer, supra note 110, at 569. 
323. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.  
324. See id. at 591–92 (“[T]he role of the courts is to distinguish between ‘[b]iting criticism [that 
merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement[, which] usurps it.’” (alterations in original) 
(quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986))). 
325. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930–31 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Only an 
impact on potential licensing revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets 
should be legally cognizable when evaluating a secondary use’s ‘effect upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.’” (citation omitted)).  
326. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614–15 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“[A] copyright holder cannot prevent others from entering fair use markets merely ‘by 
developing or licensing a market for parody, news reporting, educational or other transformative uses 
of its own creative work . . . . [A] publisher’s willingness to pay license fees for reproduction of 
images does not establish that the publisher may not, in the alternative, make fair use of those images.” 
(quoting Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Caro Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998))). 
11 - Snow (4).docx (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2019  8:45 PM 
324 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:275 
 
decision-makers to draw inferences about actual and potential markets for 
the copyrighted work and actual and potential effects of the use on those 
markets. It involves subjective judgment. 
Applied to Oracle, the fourth factor raises the question of whether 
Google has caused market harm to an actual or potential market for Java 
API. The actual market for the Java API did not appear to include 
smartphones: Oracle had licensed the Java API for programming on only 
desktops and laptops.327 Yet some phone companies (prior to the advent 
of the smartphone) had employed Java as an operating system, and, 
furthermore, Oracle had planned to license Java API for use in 
smartphones.328 Nevertheless, even prior to Android, Oracle’s 
predecessor, Sun, had made all of the relevant Java design code available 
for free to programmers under an open-source license, with only a lenient 
“give-back” provision.329 Given these facts, the questions arise: Is the 
smartphone market a traditional, reasonable, or likely-to-be-developed 
market for the Java API? If it is, does Google’s use of the 37 packages 
detrimentally affect that market? Reasonable minds may disagree. 
Although much more could be said about each factor, relevant to the 
discussion here is the simple fact that reasonable minds often differ as to 
whether each of these factors—and their sub-issues—suggests fairness in 
any given case. And even assuming that decision-makers agree on each 
factor, reasonable minds may disagree on the weight that each factor 
receives in the analysis.330 Hence, a decision-maker can reasonably 
construe a defendant’s use as supporting contrary views about whether the 
use is fair. The factors require subjective opinion about the specific facts 
under consideration. As a flexible, case-by-case doctrine, fair use 
inherently involves discretionary judgment of a decision-maker, which 
invites subjective assessments. That is by design. 
                                                     
327. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d at 1208. 
328. See id. at 1209. 
329. See Oracle III, No. 10-03561, 2016 WL 3181206, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2018), rev’d, 886 
F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
330. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, 584 (1994) (“Nor may the four 
statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results 
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”) (explaining that the statutory examples of 
fair and infringing purposes do not necessarily imply that particular uses made for those purposes are 
in fact fair or infringing). 
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B. Suitability of a Jury 
1. Diversity 
Given the sort of questions that arise in the fair-use analysis, the 
institution of a jury brings a valuable perspective to that analysis as 
compared to the institution of a judge. This perspective derives from a 
jury’s diversity of life experiences. Life experiences shape value 
judgments, perspectives, and opinions.331 Diversity brings a divergence of 
cultural understandings, practices, and norms.332 This characteristic of 
diversity is especially relevant in deciding whether a use is fair, for an 
assessment of fairness demands an understanding of cultural norms and 
social values.333 As one commentator has observed: “The reference to 
fairness in the doctrine of fair use imparts to the copyright scheme a 
bounded normative element that . . . gives effect to the community’s 
established practices and understandings . . . .”334 The established 
practices and understandings of a community define whether a use’s 
purpose is socially beneficial, whether the content of the original work 
merits strong protection, whether the defendant used a significant quantity 
or a qualitatively substantial amount of the original work, and whether the 
use could plausibly cause harm to a potential market of the copyrighted 
                                                     
331. See Christina S. Carbone & Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity and the Civil Jury, 55 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 837, 856–57 (2014) (arguing that differences in income, unemployment, educational 
attainment, and homeownership—within distinct racial groups—informs a juror’s “attitudes, beliefs, 
and assumptions about the world,” thereby creating “differences in viewpoints [that] could affect a 
juror’s approach to a case,” including a juror’s “interpretation of subjective and vague standards 
commonly found in civil cases, such as ‘reasonable,’ ‘substantial,’ and ‘due care’”). 
332. See id. 
333. Cf. 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 15.2, at 351–52 (2d ed. 1986) 
(discussing fact-finding process of jury and noting room for consideration of policy to choose between 
equally indemonstrable generalizations); Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. 
PA. L. REV. 111, 113 (1924) (observing that mixed questions of law and fact regarding whether 
defendant’s conduct was reasonable in negligence context raise social value judgments of normative 
nature). See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and 
Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 526–27 (2007) (“What constitutes a transformative use is 
potentially highly subjective.”); Leval, supra note 189, at 1105–07 (noting vagueness of fair use 
doctrine results in individualized judgments); John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative 
Use, Free Speech, and an Intermediate Liability Proposal, BYU L. REV. 1201, 1252 (2005) 
(“[D]rawing the line between transformative and non-transformative uses is laden with 
subjectivity.”).  
334. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1137, 1161 (1990) (emphasis added) (“The reference to fairness in the doctrine of fair use imparts to 
the copyright scheme a bounded normative element that is desirable in itself. It gives effect to the 
community’s established practices and understandings and allows the location of copyright within the 
framework of property generally.”). 
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work. In short, the heterogeneous composition of a jury provides a 
collective perspective that is more likely to reflect the norms and values 
of a community and culture, and that perspective is especially valuable to 
the process of assessing whether a use is fair.335 
The institution of a judge, by contrast, lacks such a heterogeneous 
perspective.336 A trial judge has only one set of life experience from which 
to form opinions. Even an appellate review panel, consisting of multiple 
judges, often comprises homogeneous life experiences (highly 
educated,337 high incomes,338 older in age,339 usually white,340 and usually 
trained only in the law341). And if their life experiences happen to be 
diverse, they are only three in number (or two for a majority). Absent in 
an appellate panel is the jury’s diverse reservoir of cultural values and life 
experiences.342 Hence, the possibility that fair use presents a close call 
                                                     
335. See Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Summary 
judgment historically has been withheld in copyright cases because courts have been reluctant to make 
subjective determinations between two works.”). 
336. See Snow, Judges Playing Jury, supra note 18, at 500 (discussing superiority of jury at 
deciding fair use over judges). 
337. An overwhelming majority of sitting federal judges have attended top-tier law schools. See 
Adam Feldman, Law Schools, Judges, and Government Attorneys, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (Sept. 10, 
2017), https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/09/10/law-schools/ [https://perma.cc/2RG9-5WMZ]. 
338. As of 2018, a federal district judge receives $208,000 as an annual salary. See Judicial 
Compensation, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation 
[https://perma.cc/L4MU-AAT3]. A federal appellate judges receives $220,600 as an annual salary. 
See id. This amount places a federal judge in the top 6-7% of household incomes in the United 
States—not counting any income that a judge’s spouse might receive. See United States Household 
Income Brackets and Percentiles in 2018, DQYDJ (Dec. 29, 2018), https://dqydj.com/united-states-
household-income-brackets-percentiles/ [https://perma.cc/3EET-79BB]. 
339. Since 2000, the average age of Article III federal judges has been increasing from 65, 
approaching 70. See Demography of Article III Judges, 1789–2017, FED. JUD. CTR. (2017), 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/age-and-experience-judges#_ftnref7 
[https://perma.cc/U3EY-PHKL]. 
340. Based on data from the years of 1940 to 2017, Article III federal judges reflect an 
overwhelming majority of the white Caucasian race. See id. 
341. Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a 
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” (emphasis added)). 
342. Juries, of course, are not always entirely diverse. See Ashish S. Joshi & Christina T. Kline, 
Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with Individual Consequences, AM. B. ASS’N (Sept. 1, 
2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/diversity-inclusion/articles/2015/ 
lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-individual-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/KT27-GLQ8]. 
Studies relative to individual areas show that the white race may be overrepresented. See, e.g., 
MAUREEN BERNER ET AL., A PROCESS EVALUATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF JURY POOL 
FORMATION IN NORTH CAROLINA’S JUDICIAL DISTRICT 15B, at 9 (2016), 
https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/reports/2016-10-05%2020150100%20REPO 
RT%20Jury%20Pool_Berner.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ6V-48GU] (“Our survey analysis indicated a 
small but persistent pattern of overrepresentation of whites and underrepresentation of African 
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does not mean that judges should step in. Just the opposite: it means that 
judges should refrain from upsetting the consensus that a diversity of 
jurors has reached. 
One might argue that the complexities of technology should diminish 
the role of a jury in deciding lawsuits, where billions of dollars may be at 
stake.343 Often jurors lack higher educational backgrounds, which might 
suggest that they lack the legal sophistication to draw and weigh 
inferences about complex technologies.344 The argument, then, is that the 
complexity of the technologies in dispute reduces the effectiveness of 
juries at deciding the issue of fair use in certain cases.345 
This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, the complexity 
of a technology does not usually determine the issues of fair use. In 
Oracle, the computer-programming language certainly represents a 
complex technology. But understanding the issues does not require a deep 
understanding of the technology. For instance, a juror must decide 
whether Google’s provision of Android for free, which increases its sales 
of Android apps, suggests that Google’s use of the Java API is not 
commercial. The juror, then, must decide whether Google’s use of the API 
falls within the meaning of commercial enterprise in the gig economy of 
this culture. The process for making this decision is not complex; it 
requires a simple judgment that benefits from a well-diversified 
perspective. 
                                                     
Americans among jury pool survey respondents in Chatham and Orange counties [of North Carolina], 
but we did not find a similar pattern for Hispanics. There are additional disparities among the survey 
results with respect to sex and household size when compared to census data.”). The Author is not 
aware of any comprehensive study of federal jury demographics across the country, or more 
specifically, those demographics in copyright cases (given that attorneys may exercise strikes 
differently according to the type of case being tried). Nevertheless, even assuming that jury 
compositions do not reflect the actual diversity of citizens within our country, there is still a greater 
likelihood for diversity of viewpoint in a jury as compared to a judge: the institution of the jury draws 
from a much more diverse pool of potential candidates than does the institution of the judge. 
Specifically, the jury institution draws from most citizens of a community, whereas the judge 
institution draws from only citizens who are highly educated, high-income, and usually older in age. 
Compare Juror Qualifications, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-
service/juror-qualifications [https://perma.cc/6DJT-WVLD] (reciting requirements for federal juror 
eligibility), with sources cited supra notes 338–339. 
343. See Susan Decker, Google Could Owe Oracle $8.8 Billion in Android Fight, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 27, 2018, 6:44 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-27/oracle-wins-
revival-of-billion-dollar-case-against-google [https://perma.cc/M5HQ-WQZ4]. 
344. See Nimmer, supra note 110, at 587–89 (recognizing belief that “laymen were not fit to 
discharge the duties [of deciding the fair-use issue] that were challenging even to specialists in the 
field,” and arguing against that belief). 
345. See Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 165 F.3d 120, 136 n.5 (2d Cir. 1998) (Newman, 
J., dissenting in part), rev’d, 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (“[J]uries have a difficult time understanding the 
principles of such unfamiliar fields of law as copyright and trademark . . . .”). 
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Second, juries regularly consider complex factual issues. Antitrust 
cases, for instance, require juries to consider complicated economic 
issues, such as the impact of anti-competitive activities on the competitive 
market.346 Antitrust cases present issues related to sophisticated economic 
transactions to a jury. Similarly, products-liabilities cases require juries to 
weigh the safety benefits of an omitted design feature against the costs of 
including it, accounting for any reduction in utility of the product.347 
Product designs, omissions, and their potential effects pose intricate 
complexities for juries to consider. To be sure, complexity alone does not 
mandate that a judge decide an issue. 
2. Impartiality 
A jury is more likely to be impartial in assessing whether a use is fair. 
Factors irrelevant to the fair-use inquiry may affect the subjective 
judgment that fair use demands. Such factors may be influential only on 
a subconscious level, perhaps affecting only the framework through which 
the decision-maker views an issue.348 Subtle but significant, such a 
perspective bias is possible with any jurist—judge or juror alike. Yet the 
institution of a jury requires consensus from many more members than a 
                                                     
346. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 497–98 (1988) 
(upholding jury’s “findings that petitioner’s actions had an adverse impact on competition, were not 
the least restrictive means of expressing petitioner’s opposition to the use of polyvinyl chloride 
conduit in the marketplace, and unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the antitrust laws”). 
347. See, e.g., Casey v. Toyota Motor Eng’g & Mfg. N. Am., Inc., 770 F.3d 322, 333–34 (5th Cir. 
2014) (“To prove safer alternative design, a plaintiff must show the safety benefits from [the] 
proposed design are foreseeably greater than the resulting costs, including any diminished usefulness 
or diminished safety . . . . ‘[T]here was sufficient evidence for a jury to find [that the witness]’s 
testimony satisfied the requisite risk-utility test.’” (quoting Hodges v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 474 F.3d 
188, 197 (5th Cir. 2006))). 
348. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 477 (2007) (questioning whether presence of unconscious bias based 
on race, gender, and other legally protected characteristics—pervasiveness of which psychological 
studies have demonstrated—affects legally relevant behavior); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does 
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1200–01 (2009) 
(noting white preference among white Americans and observing that scientific studies “reveal implicit 
or unconscious bias”). Professor Steven Burton has articulated the general problem as follows:  
[T]he problem of improper bias can arise also when judges characterize the facts in a 
case . . . . The sifting of evidence is guided at many points by one’s general beliefs about how 
the world works, including beliefs about various classes of people. Stereotypical beliefs can 
generate inferences from the evidence to the finding of fact and thereby introduce improper bias 
in adjudication. 
STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 249 (1992). See generally Martha Minow, Foreword: 
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 14 (1987) (“Regardless of which perspective ultimately 
seems persuasive, the possibility of multiple viewpoints challenges the assumption of objectivity and 
shows how claims to knowledge bear the imprint of those making the claims.”). 
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panel of appellate judges, and those members have a greater likelihood of 
disparate life experiences, each subject to different biases. In effect, the 
likelihood of diversity is greater with a jury, and that introduces a 
likelihood of diversity of biases, such that a particular external bias is less 
likely to prevail in a jury’s view of fairness. Judges, by contrast, lack this 
likelihood of diversity, so their homogeneous composition is more likely 
to effectuate implicit bias.349 
An example of this form of bias may have occurred in Oracle. The 
Federal Circuit exercises exclusive jurisdiction for appeals of patent 
cases.350 Arguably, this exclusive jurisdiction has influenced its rulings in 
a way that are more agreeable to the patent bar.351 Some commentators 
have argued that the Federal Circuit may be viewing issues in a light that 
is more conducive to upholding patent rights.352 How is this relevant to 
the Oracle Court’s treatment of fair use? Although patent law is not 
copyright law, the differences between their regimes do not necessarily 
erase (and indeed may exacerbate) the likelihood of partiality in framing 
issues. Consider that patent law lacks any fair-use doctrine.353 As a result, 
a Federal Circuit judge, who most often is viewing intellectual property 
issues through the lens of patent law, might not recognize the importance 
of the fair-use doctrine to the same degree that a jury might.354 
                                                     
349. See supra note 342 (discussing diversity of jury pool). 
350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2018) (providing exclusive jurisdiction of patent appeals to 
Federal Circuit). 
351. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 350, 351 
n.7 (2014) (“Exclusive jurisdiction may also make the court too responsive to the desires of the patent 
bar.” (relying on LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 99 (2006) (arguing that judges 
on courts with subject-matter jurisdiction “are likely to orient themselves toward the legal fields on 
which they concentrate and toward the lawyers in those fields”))). 
352. See Clark D. Asay, Patenting Elasticities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 61 (2017) (“Some have 
suggested that the court may have been motivated to take this expansive view in order to counteract 
the weakening of patent rights it had witnessed over the last several years. Indeed, as the exclusive 
court of appeals for patent cases, the Federal Circuit has had a front-row seat to the last decade’s 
general weakening of patent rights by the Supreme Court and Congress.”); Pamela Samuelson, 
Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright 
Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1291 (2017) (“The [Federal Circuit]’s Oracle opinion 
may reflect that court’s anxiety that software would be underprotected by IP law if it ruled in Google’s 
favor so soon after the Supreme Court’s Alice decision substantially cut back on the availability of 
patent protection for software-related inventions.”). 
353. Cf. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1177 (2000) (proposing fair use for patent law). 
354. See Krista A. Cox, Oracle v. Google Is More Evidence that the Federal Circuit Has No 
Business Deciding Copyright Cases, ABOVE THE L. (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/03/oracle-v-google-is-more-evidence-that-the-federal-circuit-has-no-
business-deciding-copyright-cases/ [https://perma.cc/C2UD-JMFJ] (suggesting “the Federal 
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Furthermore, consider that Google seems sufficiently wealthy to license 
the intellectual property at issue, suggesting that fair use is not necessary 
for the copyright regime to work efficiently. Such reasoning might make 
sense to a judge who most often hears patent issues, as contrasted with a 
regular jury. 
Similar to this bias of viewing the fair-use issue through a general 
framework of patent law, the Federal Circuit might view the fair-use issue 
through a specific doctrinal framework within patent law. The Oracle 
opinion suggests that the Federal Circuit did exactly this, explicitly 
comparing the standard of review for fair use to the standard of review for 
obviousness in patent law.355 The Federal Circuit stated in its Oracle 
opinion: 
[T]his is similar to the standard we apply in obviousness cases [of 
patent law]. Because obviousness is a mixed question of law and 
fact, we “first presume that the jury resolved the underlying 
factual disputes in favor of the verdict and leave those presumed 
findings undisturbed if they are supported by substantial 
evidence. Then we examine the ultimate legal conclusion of 
obviousness de novo to see whether it is correct in light of the 
presumed jury fact findings.”356 
As noted here, for the issue of obviousness in patent law, the Federal 
Circuit applies deferential review only with respect to underlying 
historical facts. The inferences to be drawn from those facts, and thereby 
the ultimate conclusion of obviousness, are subject to de novo review. 
And to a certain extent, this reasoning makes sense (at least more so than 
the reasoning does for the issue of fair use)357: there seems to be a degree 
of objectivity in the obviousness inquiry, which compares the invention 
with the knowledge of someone in the field as well as the prior art.358 
Absent is the sort of highly subjective inquiry that fair use requires. In this 
way, the two inquiries are distinct.359 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit 
                                                     
Circuit’s bias in favor of strong intellectual property rights” and that “the Federal Circuit 
predetermined what it wanted the outcome of the case to be”). 
355. Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1195 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
356. Id. (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 
F.3d 1342, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
357. But see Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Soverain Software 
v. Newegg, Inc., 571 U.S. 1127 (2014) (No. 13-477), 2013 WL 6115818 (arguing that Seventh 
Amendment precludes the Federal Circuit from reviewing jury finding of obviousness under a de 
novo standard). 
358. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
359. But see id. at 18 (recognizing that “difficulties in applying the nonobviousness test” are likely 
to arise and that “[w]hat is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be uniformity of 
11 - Snow (4).docx (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2019  8:45 PM 
2019] WHO DECIDES FAIR USE? 331 
 
appears to have viewed fair use through its patent lens of obviousness. Its 
patent-oriented framework could have unduly influenced its treatment of 
fair use. 
Thus, juries appear better suited than judges to decide the fair-use issue. 
As explained above, fair use raises questions over which reasonable minds 
often disagree—normative questions that concern whether a use should 
be permissible.360 In the face of these questions, a heterogeneous jury pool 
offers a more diversified perspective that informs the meaning and 
implications of a defendant’s use. The jury also is less likely to suffer from 
viewpoint bias than is a homogeneous judicial panel, as exemplified by 
the Federal Circuit treating fair use like a patent issue. Juries provide a 
degree of diversity and impartiality that better fits the open-ended 
determination of whether a use is fair. 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution requires that appellate courts defer to jury findings on 
the issue of fair use. English common-law courts have recognized a 
litigant’s right to a jury in copyright disputes—and specifically on fair-
use issues—dating back to 1785.361 History dispositively establishes a 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury.362 So in the absence of an 
unreasonable interpretation of evidence, appellate courts may not interfere 
with a jury’s finding of fair use. 
This conclusion is supported by the Court’s recent holding in 
U.S. Bank, where the Court taught principles that determine the proper 
review standard for mixed questions of law and fact.363 Specifically, the 
fact-specific nature of fair use depends largely on value judgments, which 
juries are well positioned to make, and that suggests a deferential 
review.364 Furthermore, this conclusion is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s statement in Harper that a reviewing court may independently 
analyze the fair-use factors: that statement must apply only in the context 
of reviewing a bench trial.365 
                                                     
thought in every given factual context” such that the obviousness inquiry “should be amenable to a 
case-by-case development”). 
360. See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
361. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
362. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
363. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 960 (2018). 
364. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
365. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); discussion 
supra Section III.B. 
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The law prefers a jury to decide whether a use is fair because the issue 
raises questions that call for subjective judgments.366 Those questions 
demand a comprehension of subtle nuances in expression, as well as an 
application of social values and norms of society.367 The jury is in the best 
position to make these judgments.368 A jury offers a diversity of life 
experiences that informs a judgment of fairness.369 Additionally, the 
plurality of jurors protects against biases that could otherwise affect the 
analytical framework through which jurists decide the fair-use issue.370 
Thus, the Oracle Court was wrong to treat the jury determination of 
fair use as “advisory only.”371 The jury concluded that Google’s use was 
fair, and that should decide the issue. The Constitution, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, and sound policy all mandate that the Federal Circuit 
should have deferred to the judgment of the jury. 
                                                     
366. See discussion supra Part IV. 
367. See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
368. See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
369. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1. 
370. See discussion supra Section IV.B.2. 
371. See Oracle IV, 886 F.3d 1179, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
